Argentina

Law 27,442 created the ANC as an autonomous body, but it is not yet fully operational. The CNDC within the Secretariat of Commerce continues to conduct investigations and recommend decisions to the Secretary.

Horizontal agreements including price-fixing, market allocation, output restriction, and bid-rigging are prohibited under Article 2 of Law 27,442. Hard-core cartels may attract the highest penalties.

Vertical agreements that restrict or distort competition are prohibited. Resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, and territorial restrictions are assessed under a rule-of-reason approach.

Abuse of dominant position is prohibited under Article 3. Prohibited conduct includes predatory pricing, discriminatory treatment, tying, refusal to deal, and exclusionary practices.

Mandatory pre-merger notification for transactions where the combined turnover of parties exceeds a prescribed threshold. The authority may approve, conditionally approve, or oppose mergers.

Formal leniency programme established under Law 27,442. The first applicant may receive full immunity from fines. Subsequent applicants may receive reductions of up to 50%.

The authority may accept structural or behavioural commitments in merger cases. Formal settlement or commitment procedures for conduct cases are not well developed in practice.

Fines up to 30% of the turnover of the economic group in the affected market for the duration of the infringement. Individual liability for directors and managers. No criminal sanctions for competition offences.

No dedicated digital markets legislation. The CNDC has applied general competition rules to digital platforms and has issued opinions on digital economy matters.

ENACOM (telecommunications), ENARGAS (gas), ENRE (electricity), and CNV (securities) have sector-specific roles, but the competition authority retains primary jurisdiction for competition enforcement.

The CNDC may conduct inspections and require production of documents. Dawn raid powers exist under Law 27,442, but practical utilisation has been limited during the institutional transition.

Private damages actions may be brought before civil courts. Private competition litigation remains uncommon in practice, with most enforcement driven by the CNDC.

Bilateral cooperation with Brazil (Mercosur framework), Chile, and the US. Active member of ICN and participates in OECD and UNCTAD competition peer reviews.

Enforcement pace has been moderate due to institutional transition. Notable investigations in cement, healthcare, and financial services. Merger control remains the most active area of enforcement.