Voluntary Delisting of Shares in India: SEBI Regulations, Reverse Book Building and Minority Shareholder Rights

Introduction
When a listed company proposes to delist its equity shares, the decision has implications beyond the removal of its securities from stock exchanges. For promoters and acquirers, voluntary delisting provides an opportunity to consolidate ownership and transition into an unlisted structure. For public shareholders, however, it raises a more fundamental question: whether the exit price adequately reflects the value of their investment and whether they have meaningful protection if they disagree with the proposed transaction.
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2021 establish the framework governing voluntary delisting in India. The Regulations prescribe the conditions under which listed companies may delist their equity shares, the pricing mechanisms available to acquirers and the exit opportunities that must be provided to public shareholders.
A significant change was introduced through the SEBI (Delisting of Equity Shares) (Amendment) Regulations, 2024, which came into effect on 25 September 2024. The amendments introduced a fixed-price process alongside the existing reverse book building mechanism, revised the counter-offer requirements and introduced additional provisions for investment holding companies. In September 2025, SEBI further introduced a special delisting framework for eligible public sector undertakings (PSUs).
These developments have expanded the available routes for voluntary delisting while raising questions about the adequacy of minority shareholder protection, particularly in transactions where the exit price is determined without competitive price discovery.
This article examines the regulatory framework for voluntary delisting in India, the distinction between reverse book building and the fixed-price process, the applicable approval and pricing requirements, and the remedies available to minority shareholders who object to a proposed delisting.
Understanding Voluntary Delisting Under the SEBI Delisting Regulations
Delisting refers to the removal of a company’s equity shares from a recognised stock exchange, resulting in the cessation of trading in those securities on that exchange. Under the SEBI Delisting Regulations, voluntary delisting generally involves a proposal by the acquirer, which may be the promoter or another eligible acquirer, to acquire the equity shares held by public shareholders and remove the company’s securities from the stock exchange.
The regulatory framework is designed to ensure that public shareholders receive an opportunity to exit at a price determined in accordance with prescribed valuation and procedural safeguards.
The principal routes relevant to voluntary delisting include:
- Reverse Book Building (RBB): Public shareholders indicate the prices at which they are willing to sell their shares, and the discovered price is determined through the bidding process.
- Fixed Price Process: The acquirer offers a predetermined price that must be at least 15% higher than the applicable floor price, subject to the prescribed eligibility conditions.1
- Scheme-based delisting: Certain eligible listed subsidiaries and investment holding companies may use a scheme of arrangement under the specific provisions of the Delisting Regulations and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.
- Special PSU delisting framework: Eligible public sector undertakings may use the special fixed-price mechanism introduced in September 2025.
The route selected has a direct bearing on how the exit price is determined, the extent of shareholder participation and the procedural safeguards available to public investors.
Determining the Floor Price: Regulation 19A
Regardless of whether the acquirer chooses reverse book building or the fixed-price process, the delisting offer must comply with the minimum pricing requirements prescribed under Regulation 19A.2
The floor price represents the minimum price at which the delisting offer may be made. Regulation 19A requires the floor price to be no lower than the highest of the applicable benchmarks:
- The volume-weighted average price paid or payable by the acquirer and persons acting in concert for acquisitions during the 52 weeks immediately preceding the reference date.
- The highest price paid or payable for any acquisition by the acquirer and persons acting in concert during the 26 weeks immediately preceding the reference date.
- The adjusted book value of the company, based on consolidated financial statements and determined by an independent registered valuer, except in the case of public sector undertakings.
- The volume-weighted average market price over the 60 trading days immediately preceding the reference date on the stock exchange where the maximum trading volume is recorded, provided the shares are frequently traded.
- For infrequently traded shares, the price determined by an independent registered valuer after considering relevant valuation parameters, including book value, comparable trading multiples and other customary valuation methodologies.
The reference date for determining the floor price is generally the date of the initial public announcement. Where the announcement is made after market hours or on a non-trading day, the next trading day is considered the reference date.
The inclusion of adjusted book value and independent valuation benchmarks is significant because it extends the pricing exercise beyond historical market prices and acquisition costs. It seeks to account for the underlying value of the company, particularly where market trading may not adequately reflect its financial position. However, the floor price should not be confused with the final exit price. It establishes the regulatory minimum, while the ultimate price depends on the process adopted and the applicable acceptance requirements.
Reverse Book Building and the Fixed-Price Process: Key Differences
The 2024 amendments introduced the fixed-price process as an alternative to reverse book building. Both mechanisms are intended to provide an exit opportunity to public shareholders, but they approach price determination differently.
A. Reverse Book Building: Shareholder-Led Price Discovery
Under reverse book building, public shareholders are invited to tender their shares at prices at or above the prescribed floor price. The discovered price is the price at which the cumulative shareholding of the acquirer, together with the shares tendered or offered by public shareholders at that price or below, reaches the 90% threshold prescribed under the Regulations.
The acquirer may also announce an indicative price above the floor price before the bidding process begins. The acquirer’s obligation to accept the discovered price depends on the applicable pricing provisions. Where the discovered price is at or below the indicative price, the acquirer is required to accept it. Where the discovered price exceeds the indicative price, the acquirer may decide whether to accept the discovered price or reject the offer, subject to the counter-offer mechanism under Regulation 22.
Reverse book building gives public shareholders an opportunity to influence the exit price through their bids. However, this mechanism can create difficulties where shareholders have substantially different expectations of the company’s value or where the discovered price exceeds the acquirer’s willingness to pay.
B. Fixed-Price Process: A Predetermined Exit Price
Regulation 20A, introduced through the 2024 amendments, permits an acquirer to undertake voluntary delisting through a fixed-price process, provided the company’s equity shares are frequently traded. Under this route, the acquirer specifies a fixed delisting price that must be at least 15% higher than the floor price determined under Regulation 19A.
Unlike reverse book building, public shareholders do not submit bids to establish a discovered price. Instead, they decide whether to tender their shares at the price offered by the acquirer. The acquirer is required to accept the shares tendered where its post-offer shareholding, together with the shares tendered by public shareholders, reaches at least 90% of the total issued shares of the relevant class, calculated in accordance with the Regulations.
The fixed-price process provides greater pricing certainty and may simplify the delisting exercise. However, it removes the competitive price-discovery mechanism available under reverse book building.
Reverse Book Building vs Fixed-Price Process
| Parameter | Reverse Book Building | Fixed-Price Process |
| Price determination | Discovered through shareholder bids | Predetermined by the acquirer |
| Eligibility | Available subject to the general delisting requirements | Available only for frequently traded shares |
| Minimum price | Regulation 19A floor price | At least 15% above the Regulation 19A floor price |
| Shareholder participation | Shareholders bid at or above the floor price | Shareholders decide whether to tender |
| Price discovery | Shareholder-driven | No competitive bidding |
| Counter-offer | Permitted subject to Regulation 22 | Not available under this process |
| Success threshold | 90% post-offer shareholding | 90% post-offer shareholding |
The choice between these mechanisms is therefore not merely procedural. It determines the extent to which shareholders participate in price discovery and the degree of pricing certainty available to the acquirer.
The 90% Success Threshold and Shareholder Approval Requirements
The 90% threshold is one of the central conditions governing voluntary delisting under the SEBI Regulations. Under Regulation 21, the delisting offer is successful only if the post-offer shareholding of the acquirer, together with the shares tendered or offered by public shareholders at the applicable price, reaches at least 90% of the total issued shares of the relevant class.
The calculation must be undertaken in accordance with the exclusions prescribed under the Regulations, including specified holdings of custodians against depository receipts, employee benefit trusts and inactive shareholders. The 90% requirement is therefore a post-offer shareholding test, rather than a requirement that 90% of public shareholders individually approve the proposal.3
Approvals Required Before the Delisting Offer
The delisting process is subject to several procedural and corporate approval requirements.
- Board approval and due diligence: The board of directors must consider and approve the delisting proposal in accordance with the Regulations. The company is also required to obtain a due diligence report from a peer-reviewed company secretary, addressing matters prescribed under Regulation 8.
- Shareholder approval: The proposal must be approved through a special resolution passed by postal ballot or electronic voting. Importantly, the resolution is acted upon only where the votes cast by public shareholders in favour of the proposal are at least twice the votes cast against it.
- This voting requirement provides public shareholders with an important safeguard at an early stage of the process, before the final exit price is established.
- Independent directors’ recommendation: The committee of independent directors must provide a reasoned recommendation on the delisting proposal, taking into account the interests of public shareholders. The recommendation, together with the prescribed voting disclosures, must be made available within the timelines specified under the Regulations.
- Escrow arrangements: The acquirer must establish and fund the escrow account in accordance with the applicable requirements. The escrow mechanism provides financial assurance that the consideration payable to shareholders will be available when required.
These requirements collectively seek to ensure that the delisting proposal is supported by appropriate corporate approvals, independent scrutiny and financial arrangements.
The Counter-Offer Mechanism: What Changed in 2024?
One of the more consequential changes introduced by the 2024 amendments concerns the counter-offer mechanism under Regulation 22.
Under the revised framework, an acquirer undertaking delisting through reverse book building may make a counter-offer where the following two conditions are satisfied:
- The post-offer shareholding of the acquirer, together with the shares tendered or offered by public shareholders, is at least 75% of the total issued shares of the relevant class.
- At least 50% of the public shareholding has been tendered or offered.
The counter-offer may be made within two working days of the closure of the bidding period.
The counter-offer price cannot be lower than the higher of:
- The applicable volume-weighted average price of the shares tendered or offered during the reverse book building process; and
- The indicative price, if any, announced by the acquirer.
The Regulations also prescribe how the VWAP is to be calculated depending on whether the acquirer’s cumulative shareholding, together with the tendered shares, is below or has reached the 90% threshold. Shareholders who have tendered their shares are provided an opportunity to withdraw them within the prescribed ten-working-day period following the counter-offer.
Importantly, the counter-offer does not dispense with the 90% success requirement. The offer can be completed only if the applicable post-offer shareholding threshold is achieved at the counter-offer price. The revised mechanism makes it possible for an acquirer to continue the delisting process even where the initial discovered price is commercially unacceptable, provided the prescribed eligibility conditions are met.
For minority shareholders, however, this introduces a different consideration. While the counter-offer provides an alternative exit price, its VWAP-based pricing mechanism may not necessarily reflect the valuation expectations of shareholders who participated in the original bidding process. Where a delisting offer fails, the acquirer is generally restricted from making another delisting offer for six months, subject to the applicable provisions of the Regulations.
Minority Shareholder Protection: What Happens When Shareholders Disagree With the Exit Price?
The effectiveness of the delisting framework depends not only on the pricing mechanisms available but also on the remedies available to shareholders who do not agree with the proposed exit. The Regulations provide safeguards at different stages of the delisting process.
A. Voting Against the Delisting Proposal
The special-resolution requirement provides public shareholders with an opportunity to oppose the proposal before the bidding or tendering process begins. Since the resolution can be acted upon only when votes cast in favour by public shareholders are at least twice the votes cast against it, public shareholder participation can materially affect the outcome. Shareholders should therefore examine the explanatory statement, the proposed rationale for delisting, the acquirer’s disclosures and the independent directors’ reasoned recommendation before voting.
B. Participating in Reverse Book Building
Under reverse book building, shareholders can submit bids reflecting the price at which they are willing to exit, subject to the prescribed floor price and bidding requirements. However, shareholders should recognise that an excessively high bid may affect the discovered price and the likelihood of the acquirer accepting the offer. The counter-offer mechanism also changes the commercial dynamics of the process. Under the fixed-price route, shareholders do not have the same ability to influence the price through bidding. Their principal decision is whether to tender their shares at the offered price or retain their investment.
C. The One-Year Post-Delisting Exit Opportunity
A shareholder who does not participate in the delisting offer, or whose shares are not accepted, is not necessarily left without an exit mechanism. Under Regulation 26, the acquirer is required to provide an exit opportunity to remaining public shareholders for at least one year from the date of delisting, at the same exit price at which the shares were accepted during the delisting process. This mechanism is particularly important for shareholders who were unable to participate during the initial offer period or who chose not to tender their shares.
However, the protection is limited in one important respect: it preserves an opportunity to sell at the applicable exit price, but it does not guarantee that the price will reflect any subsequent increase in the company’s value.
D. Challenging Regulatory or Procedural Irregularities
Where a delisting proposal involves fraud, manipulation, inadequate disclosure or non-compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements, affected shareholders may consider the remedies available under the SEBI framework and other applicable laws. Regulation 4(5) prohibits fraudulent or manipulative practices in connection with delisting. SEBI may also exercise its statutory powers to issue appropriate directions where violations are established.
In cases involving a scheme of arrangement, shareholders may raise objections before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), subject to the requirements of the Companies Act, 2013. Orders of the NCLT may be challenged before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in accordance with the applicable law.
The distinction between a disagreement over valuation and an identifiable legal or procedural irregularity is important. A shareholder’s dissatisfaction with the price, by itself, does not automatically establish a ground for setting aside a delisting or a scheme of arrangement.
Scheme-Based Delisting and the ICICI Securities Litigation
Not every delisting transaction follows the conventional reverse book building or fixed-price process. The SEBI framework also permits certain eligible listed subsidiaries to be delisted through a scheme of arrangement under Regulation 37 of the SEBI Delisting Regulations, read with the applicable provisions of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.
This route became particularly significant in the proposed merger of ICICI Securities Limited with its holding company, ICICI Bank Limited. The transaction involved the delisting of ICICI Securities through a scheme of arrangement under which public shareholders were to receive ICICI Bank shares in exchange for their holdings in ICICI Securities.
The proposed transaction attracted objections from minority shareholders, including Quantum Mutual Fund, concerning the eligibility of the companies to use the scheme-based route, the valuation methodology and the treatment of public shareholders.
In Quantum Mutual Fund & Ors. v. ICICI Securities Limited & Anr., the NCLAT, by its decision dated 10 March 2025, dismissed the appeals challenging the NCLT’s approval of the scheme.4 The proceedings raised important questions concerning the interpretation of Regulation 37, the applicability of the same-line-of-business requirement, the treatment of different shareholder classes and the extent to which tribunals should interfere with commercial valuation and shareholder-approved schemes.
The NCLAT’s decision is relevant because it illustrates the distinction between challenging a transaction’s commercial valuation and establishing a legally sustainable ground for intervention. It also demonstrates that scheme-based delisting must be assessed under its specific statutory and regulatory framework rather than treated as interchangeable with the ordinary reverse book building process. The decision should not, however, be understood as a general exemption from the eligibility, valuation, disclosure and approval requirements applicable to scheme-based delisting.
Special Delisting Provisions for Public Sector Undertakings
SEBI introduced a separate framework for the voluntary delisting of eligible public sector undertakings through the SEBI (Delisting of Equity Shares) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025, notified on 1 September 2025. The special provisions, inserted as Part F of the Delisting Regulations, apply to public sector undertakings other than banks, non-banking financial companies and insurance companies.
Under Regulation 38B, an eligible PSU may delist its equity shares where the aggregate shareholding of the acquirer, together with other PSUs, is equal to or exceeds 90% of the total issued shares of the relevant class.
The special framework prescribes the following requirements:
- Delisting must be approved through a special resolution passed by postal ballot or electronic voting.
- The process must be undertaken through the fixed-price route.
- The floor price must be determined using the prescribed acquisition-price benchmarks and a joint valuation report obtained from two independent registered valuers.
- The final delisting price must be at least 15% higher than the applicable floor price.
The special regime also addresses the treatment of consideration payable to remaining public shareholders where a delisted PSU subsequently undertakes a voluntary strike-off within the specified period. In such circumstances, the amount due to shareholders who did not tender their shares must be transferred to a designated stock exchange, which is required to hold the amount for seven years. Thereafter, the amount is transferred to the Investor Education and Protection Fund or, where applicable, SEBI’s Investor Protection and Education Fund, subject to the prescribed provisions.
The introduction of this separate route reflects a regulatory recognition that PSU delistings may involve different ownership structures and considerations from those applicable to privately controlled listed companies. However, the special provisions do not eliminate the requirement for valuation, shareholder approval or an exit opportunity for public shareholders.
Compliance Considerations for Acquirers and Listed Companies
While minority shareholder protection remains central to the delisting framework, acquirers and listed companies must also ensure compliance with the procedural and disclosure requirements at every stage.
Key considerations include:
For acquirers:
- Determine the appropriate delisting route and verify eligibility before initiating the process.
- Ensure that the floor price is calculated in accordance with Regulation 19A and that the valuation exercise is supported by the required reports.
- Comply with restrictions on acquisitions and disposals of shares during the prescribed periods.
- Make the required initial public announcement and complete the subsequent offer documentation within the applicable timelines.
- Establish and maintain the prescribed escrow arrangements.
- Ensure that the counter-offer, where applicable, satisfies the eligibility, pricing and timing requirements.
For listed companies:
- Obtain the prescribed board and shareholder approvals.
- Complete the required due diligence and provide material disclosures to shareholders.
- Ensure that the committee of independent directors provides a reasoned recommendation.
- Facilitate the bidding or tendering process in accordance with the Regulations.
- Ensure that the exit opportunity for remaining public shareholders is maintained for the prescribed period.
Failure to comply with the applicable requirements may expose the acquirer and the company to regulatory action, including directions and other consequences under the SEBI framework.
Conclusion
India’s voluntary delisting framework has evolved from a system primarily centred on reverse book building to a more flexible regime offering multiple routes for determining the exit price. The introduction of the fixed-price process, changes to the counter-offer mechanism and special provisions for investment holding companies and public sector undertakings have expanded the options available to acquirers.
However, greater procedural flexibility also places greater importance on the safeguards available to public shareholders. The 90% post-offer shareholding requirement, the two-to-one public shareholder voting test, independent directors’ recommendations, valuation requirements and the one-year post-delisting exit opportunity continue to form important elements of the framework.
For minority shareholders, the principal consideration is no longer limited to whether the proposed exit price is acceptable. It also involves examining the route selected by the acquirer, the applicable valuation benchmarks, the disclosures made and whether the prescribed approval and procedural requirements have been satisfied.
For acquirers and listed companies, a successful delisting requires more than achieving the prescribed shareholding threshold. It requires careful transaction structuring, accurate valuation, regulatory compliance and a transparent process that accounts for the interests of public shareholders.
Last Updated on 18 November, 2026
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