Dominance, Abuse of Dominant Position, and Relevant Market under Indian Competition Law

Posted On - 30 May, 2026 • By - Aniket Ghosh

The BookMyShow Case and the Evolving Digital Economy Framework

Introduction

The rapid expansion of digital platforms has transformed the manner in which consumers access services, purchase products, and interact with online intermediaries. As platform-based economies continue to grow, competition regulators increasingly face complex questions relating to market power, network effects, platform dominance, and anti-competitive conduct in digital markets.

One of the most significant issues under Indian competition law is determining when a company’s dominant position crosses the line into unlawful abuse. Under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, dominance itself is not prohibited. The legal prohibition applies only where a dominant enterprise engages in exploitative or exclusionary conduct that adversely affects competition.

This issue has become particularly important in the context of online movie ticket booking platforms, app-based marketplaces, e-commerce intermediaries, and digital ecosystems where convenience, network effects, and data-driven scale advantages often produce concentrated market structures.

The central questions in such cases are:

  • What constitutes the “relevant market” in digital platform economies?
  • When does a digital platform possess a dominant position?
  • What conduct amounts to abuse of dominance under Section 4?
  • Can exclusive arrangements, convenience fees, or preferential platform practices amount to anti-competitive behaviour?

This article examines the framework governing abuse of dominant position under Indian competition law, analyses the principles of relevant market determination and dominance assessment in digital markets, and discusses the evolving jurisprudence of the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), including the recent BookMyShow online movie ticket booking case.

Statutory Framework Governing Abuse of Dominance

Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002

Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits abuse of dominant position by an enterprise. Explanation (a) to Section 4 defines “dominant position” as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India which enables it to:

  • Operate independently of competitive forces; or
  • Affect competitors, consumers, or the market in its favour.

Section 4(2) identifies various forms of abusive conduct, including:

  • Imposition of unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions;
  • Restriction of production or technical development;
  • Denial of market access;
  • Limitation of consumer choice; and
  • Leveraging dominance in one market to enter another market.

Importantly, Indian competition law does not prohibit dominance itself. Enterprises may lawfully acquire significant market power through efficiency, innovation, or superior business performance. Liability arises only where such dominance is abused in a manner that harms competition.

Determination of the Relevant Market

Product and Geographic Market Analysis

The first stage in any abuse of dominance inquiry involves defining the “relevant market” under Sections 2(r), 2(s), and 2(t) of the Competition Act, 2002. The CCI evaluates factors such as:

  • Product characteristics;
  • Consumer preferences;
  • Price substitutability;
  • Switching behaviour;
  • End-use;
  • Technological characteristics; and
  • Geographic conditions of competition.

The assessment frequently involves examining whether consumers perceive competing services as interchangeable or substitutable.

The SSNIP Test and Market Substitutability

The “Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price” (“SSNIP”) test is commonly used to assess substitutability and determine whether products or services belong to the same relevant market.

In Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal,[1] the CCI observed that online and offline sales channels were merely alternative distribution mechanisms for the same products and therefore did not necessarily constitute separate markets. The Commission reasoned that consumers could readily switch between online and offline purchases depending on price and convenience.

However, Indian competition jurisprudence has also recognised that technological integration and consumer behaviour may justify distinct digital markets in certain circumstances.

For instance, in the radio taxi cases involving app-based cab aggregators such as Uber and Ola, the CCI recognised app-based taxi aggregation services as a distinct market because of:

  • Real-time booking functionality;
  • GPS integration;
  • Dynamic pricing mechanisms; and
  • User convenience.

These decisions demonstrate that relevant market determination in digital platform competition law is highly fact-specific.

Dominance in Digital Markets

Network Effects and Platform Power

Digital platforms often derive significant competitive advantages from network effects. A platform with a large user base attracts additional suppliers and consumers, which in turn further strengthens the platform’s market position. In online movie ticket booking markets, factors contributing to dominance may include:

  • Scale of theatre partnerships;
  • User traffic and transaction volume;
  • Exclusive agreements;
  • Brand recognition;
  • Data accumulation;
  • Integrated digital payment systems; and
  • Consumer dependency on platform convenience.

However, network effects alone do not automatically establish abuse of dominance.

The CCI typically examines additional factors including:

  • Market share;
  • Economic power;
  • Entry barriers;
  • Consumer switching costs;
  • Presence of competitors; and
  • Countervailing buyer power.

Abuse of Dominance under Indian Competition Law

Exclusionary and Exploitative Conduct

Competition law distinguishes between legitimate commercial success and unlawful anti-competitive conduct. Abuse of dominance generally falls into two broad categories:

Exclusionary Abuse: This includes practices intended to exclude or marginalise competitors, such as:

  • Exclusive supply agreements;
  • Market foreclosure;
  • Denial of market access;
  • Predatory pricing; and
  • Self-preferencing practices.

Exploitative Abuse: This involves unfair treatment of consumers or business users, including:

  • Excessive pricing;
  • Unfair contractual conditions; and
  • Discriminatory pricing practices.

The CCI has repeatedly emphasised that aggressive competition alone does not amount to abuse unless there is demonstrable anti-competitive harm.

Digital Platform Competition and Online Movie Ticket Booking Markets

Market Definition Challenges

Online movie ticket booking platforms operate as digital intermediation services connecting consumers and cinema operators. Although movie tickets may also be purchased through physical counters, consumers may perceive online booking platforms differently because of:

  • Seat selection functionality;
  • Convenience;
  • Mobile accessibility;
  • Cashback integration;
  • Digital payments; and
  • Real-time booking features.

Accordingly, the CCI has examined whether online ticket booking services constitute a separate relevant market distinct from offline ticket sales. In the BookMyShow matter, the Commission considered “online intermediation services for booking movie tickets” as a distinct relevant market in India.

The BookMyShow Competition Law Investigation (2026)

In March 2026, the Competition Commission of India considered allegations that BookMyShow had abused its dominant position in the online movie ticket booking market. The complaint alleged that:

  • BookMyShow imposed excessive convenience fees; and
  • Exclusive arrangements with theatres resulted in market foreclosure for competing platforms.

The Commission examined whether BookMyShow held a dominant position in the relevant market for online intermediation services relating to movie ticket booking. The CCI considered factors including:

  • Transaction volume;
  • Market share;
  • User base;
  • Scale advantages; and
  • Network effects.

Although the Commission observed indicators suggestive of market power, it ultimately concluded that the complainant failed to establish abuse of dominance. The Commission noted that competing platforms such as Paytm, Amazon Pay, and Justickets continued to operate in the market.

The CCI further held that:

  • There was insufficient evidence of foreclosure of competition;
  • Consumers retained alternative purchasing channels;
  • No unfair denial of market access was established; and
  • Convenience fees were not shown to be unfair or excessive relative to the services provided.

The complaint was therefore dismissed. The decision reinforces the principle that dominance alone is not unlawful absent demonstrable anti-competitive conduct.

Globally, competition regulators increasingly scrutinise digital platforms for issues such as:

  • Self-preferencing;
  • Data concentration;
  • Platform leveraging;
  • Algorithmic discrimination; and
  • Ecosystem lock-in.

The European Commission has pursued several investigations involving digital gatekeepers and platform abuse. Indian competition law remains comparatively cautious and evidence-based, generally requiring clear proof of foreclosure, unfairness, or consumer harm before intervention.

The CCI’s evolving jurisprudence reflects an attempt to balance:

  • Encouragement of innovation and digital growth; with
  • Prevention of anti-competitive exclusionary practices.

Practical Implications for Digital Platforms and Businesses

For Digital Platforms

Businesses operating digital marketplaces, online booking services, e-commerce platforms, and app-based ecosystems must carefully assess:

  • Exclusive arrangements;
  • Pricing structures;
  • Platform neutrality;
  • Access restrictions; and
  • Consumer choice implications.

Dominant enterprises may face heightened scrutiny regarding market access and anti-competitive effects.

For Competition Litigation

Relevant market definition remains the most critical and contested issue in abuse of dominance litigation involving digital platforms. Parties must present robust evidence regarding:

  • Consumer behaviour;
  • Substitutability;
  • Switching costs;
  • Market dynamics; and
  • Competitive constraints.

For Regulators

Digital markets require nuanced economic analysis because traditional competition tools may not fully capture platform economics, network effects, and data-driven market power.

Conclusion

The evolving jurisprudence on abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 reflects the increasing complexity of regulating digital platform economies in India. The BookMyShow decision reinforces several foundational principles of Indian competition law:

  • Determination of the relevant market is central to any abuse analysis;
  • Dominance itself is not unlawful;
  • High market share and network effects alone do not establish abuse; and
  • Anti-competitive effects such as foreclosure, unfair pricing, or denial of market access must be proven.

As India’s digital economy continues to expand, competition law authorities and courts will increasingly confront questions involving online marketplaces, digital intermediaries, data concentration, and platform governance.

The future development of Indian competition jurisprudence will likely depend upon balancing innovation and market efficiency with the need to prevent anti-competitive conduct and preserve fair competition in rapidly evolving digital markets.

  1. Case No. 17 of 2014 ↑

Last Updated on 30 May, 2026