Abuse of Dominant Position in Digital Markets in India: Key CCI Cases and Legal Developments

Introduction

Digital platforms have become integral to India’s economy, connecting consumers, businesses and service providers across search engines, app stores, e-commerce marketplaces, social networking services, digital payments and online advertising. These platforms can reduce transaction costs, expand consumer choice and enable businesses to reach wider markets. However, their scale, control over digital infrastructure and access to user data can also create competitive advantages that are difficult for rivals to overcome.

The central question under competition law is not whether a digital platform has achieved a dominant position, but whether it has used that position to restrict competition, impose unfair conditions or impede market access. In India, such conduct is primarily regulated under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act), which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.

The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has increasingly examined how digital platforms exercise control over app distribution, default settings, payment systems, user data and access to digital markets. Its proceedings involving Google and Meta’s WhatsApp service illustrate how established principles of competition law apply to business models in which monetary prices may be zero, but control over data, distribution and user access can have significant competitive consequences.

Alongside enforcement under the existing Competition Act, India has considered a separate ex-ante regulatory framework for large digital enterprises through the proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024. These developments raise important questions for digital platforms, technology companies, app developers, e-commerce businesses and startups operating in India.

Understanding Dominance Under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002

Indian competition law does not prohibit an enterprise from acquiring or maintaining a dominant position. A business may legitimately become successful through innovation, superior products, efficient operations or consumer preference. The prohibition arises when an enterprise abuses its dominant position in a relevant market.

Section 4(1) of the Competition Act prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. Section 4(2) identifies specific categories of abusive conduct, including the imposition of unfair or discriminatory conditions, restrictions on production or technical development, denial of market access, supplementary contractual obligations unrelated to the subject of a contract, and the use of dominance in one relevant market to enter into or protect another relevant market.

Determining dominance in digital markets

Under Section 19(4), the CCI considers several factors when assessing whether an enterprise holds a dominant position. These include market share, the size and resources of the enterprise, the economic power of competitors, commercial advantages, vertical integration, dependence of consumers and competitors, barriers to entry, countervailing buyer power, market structure and other relevant factors.

The assessment begins with defining the relevant market under Sections 2(r), 2(s) and 2(t) of the Competition Act, which address the relevant market, relevant geographic market and relevant product market, respectively.

In digital markets, market definition can be particularly complex. A search engine, messaging application or social networking service may be available to users without a direct monetary charge. However, the absence of a monetary price does not necessarily mean that the service operates in a competitive market. Platforms may monetise their user base through advertising, business services, subscriptions or other commercial arrangements. They may also derive competitive advantages from network effects, accumulated data and control over distribution channels.

Accordingly, an assessment of dominance in digital markets may need to consider factors beyond conventional market share, including user dependence, switching costs, network effects, access to data, technological advantages and barriers to entry. These considerations inform the statutory assessment; they do not independently establish dominance or an abuse of it.

What Constitutes Abuse of Dominant Position in Digital Markets?

Section 4(2) of the Competition Act provides the statutory framework for examining abusive conduct. Its application to digital platforms depends on the facts, the relevant market and the competitive effects of the conduct in question.

Common areas of scrutiny include:

• Unfair or discriminatory conditions: Imposing contractual or commercial terms on developers, sellers or business users that may be unfair or discriminatory within the meaning of Section 4.
• Denial of market access: Restricting competing businesses from reaching users, distributing applications or accessing an important digital platform.
• Tying and bundling: Making access to one product or service conditional on the use of another, where the arrangement satisfies the applicable legal requirements for abuse.
• Self-preferencing: Giving a platform’s own products or services preferential treatment over competing third-party offerings in circumstances that may distort competition.
• Restrictions on payments and distribution: Requiring developers to use particular payment systems or limiting alternative distribution arrangements where such restrictions constitute abusive conduct.
• Leveraging dominance: Using a dominant position in one relevant market to enter into or protect another relevant market, as addressed under Section 4(2)(e).
• Restrictions on technical development: Engaging in conduct that limits technical or scientific development to the prejudice of consumers, within the scope of Section 4(2)(b).

Digital platform conduct is not automatically unlawful merely because it involves a restrictive contractual term, a proprietary payment system or preferential placement of a product. The relevant question is whether the conduct falls within the statutory prohibition on abuse of dominance, assessed in the context of the market and the evidence.

Exploitative and exclusionary abuse

Abuse of dominance is commonly examined through two broad categories. Exploitative conduct concerns the imposition of unfair conditions or prices on consumers or business users. In digital markets, this may include conditions imposed by a dominant platform on users who have limited practical alternatives.

Exclusionary conduct concerns behaviour that restricts competitors’ ability to compete effectively. Examples may include restricting access to distribution channels, foreclosing rival applications or using contractual arrangements to protect an existing market position.

The categories can overlap. A platform’s data-sharing policy, for instance, may raise questions about the fairness of conditions imposed on users and, depending on the circumstances, the competitive advantages conferred in an adjacent market.

Why Digital Markets Present Distinct Competition Law Challenges

Several characteristics of digital markets can influence how dominance is established and how alleged abuse is assessed.

Network effects and user dependence

Network effects arise when the value of a service to an individual user increases as more people use it. Messaging applications, social networks and online marketplaces illustrate this dynamic. Users may find it difficult to switch to a competing service if their existing contacts, customers or business relationships remain on the established platform.

Such effects can reinforce an incumbent’s market position and raise the practical cost of entering the market for competitors.

Economies of scale and scope

Digital businesses can often distribute services to additional users without a proportionate increase in operating costs. Established platforms may also use existing infrastructure, customer relationships and technology to expand into adjacent markets.

These advantages can support innovation and efficiency. However, where a dominant enterprise uses its position in one market to restrict competition in another, the conduct may warrant scrutiny under Section 4.

Data as a competitive advantage

Access to data can help businesses improve products, personalise services, target advertising and develop new technologies. A platform with extensive user interactions and commercial relationships may possess advantages that are difficult for smaller competitors to replicate.

Data accumulation is not, by itself, an abuse of dominance. Its competitive significance depends on the nature of the data, the market, the conduct involved and its effect on competition.

Control over digital gateways

Some platforms operate infrastructure through which other businesses must reach customers. App stores distribute applications; e-commerce marketplaces connect sellers with buyers; and search engines influence how users discover information and services.

Where a platform simultaneously controls access to users and competes with businesses dependent on that platform, questions may arise about discriminatory treatment, self-preferencing and market access.

Competition beyond monetary prices

A service offered without a direct monetary charge may still compete on quality, privacy, choice, innovation and the terms on which users access it. Consequently, a competition assessment of digital markets cannot necessarily be confined to changes in consumer prices.

These factors help explain why the application of Section 4 to digital platforms often requires close examination of market structure, business practices and the competitive process.

CCI’s Enforcement Against Google: Android and the Play Store

The CCI’s proceedings against Google are among the most significant developments in Indian digital competition law. They illustrate how Section 4 can apply to digital ecosystems in which an enterprise operates across interconnected markets.

The Android ecosystem case

In October 2022, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹1,337.76 crore on Google for abusing its dominant position in multiple markets associated with the Android mobile device ecosystem. The CCI examined five relevant markets: licensable operating systems for smart mobile devices in India, app stores for Android mobile operating systems, general web search services, non-OS-specific mobile web browsers and online video hosting platforms.

The Commission scrutinised Google’s agreements with smartphone manufacturers, including arrangements concerning the pre-installation and placement of proprietary Google applications and restrictions affecting alternative versions of Android.

The CCI found that certain contractual arrangements conferred competitive advantages on Google’s services, restricted competing services’ access to users and reinforced Google’s position across related markets. It identified contraventions of several provisions of Section 4, including those concerning unfair conditions, denial of market access, restrictions on technical development and leveraging dominance.

In March 2023, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) upheld the ₹1,337.76 crore penalty while setting aside certain directions issued by the CCI. The Android proceedings demonstrate that the availability of competing products does not, by itself, resolve concerns about competition. Pre-installation, default settings and contractual restrictions may affect whether competing services can effectively reach users. Their legal significance, however, depends on the particular arrangements and the evidence of their competitive effects.

The Google Play Store billing case

A separate CCI proceeding concerned Google’s policies governing app distribution and in-app payments through the Google Play Store. In October 2022, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹936.44 crore, finding that specified Play Store policies contravened Section 4. The Commission examined the requirements imposed on app developers, including restrictions concerning payment systems and the conditions under which applications could distribute digital products and services.

The matter raised questions about the ability of developers to use alternative payment mechanisms and the consequences of a dominant app store controlling access to a substantial user base.

In March 2025, the NCLAT upheld the CCI’s findings concerning unfair conditions associated with mandatory use of Google’s Play Billing System and the leveraging of dominance, while setting aside certain other findings and modifying the penalty calculation. The subsequent appellate proceedings are important when assessing the current legal position. The CCI’s original findings, the NCLAT’s modifications and any further appellate developments must be distinguished rather than treated as a single, unqualified determination.

For app developers and digital businesses, the broader lesson is that distribution terms, payment arrangements and contractual restrictions imposed by a dominant platform may attract scrutiny under Section 4 where they adversely affect competition.

Meta and WhatsApp: Data Sharing, Privacy and Competition Law

The CCI’s proceedings concerning WhatsApp’s 2021 privacy policy illustrate the relationship between data practices and abuse of dominant position. In November 2024, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹213.14 crore on Meta and WhatsApp in connection with the 2021 update to WhatsApp’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.

The Commission found that WhatsApp had abused its dominant position in the market for over-the-top messaging applications through smartphones in India by imposing unfair conditions associated with expanded data sharing within the Meta group. It also examined the implications of cross-platform data sharing for competition in online display advertising.

The CCI’s concerns included the absence of a meaningful opt-out from certain data-sharing arrangements and the potential use of WhatsApp’s position in messaging to strengthen Meta’s position in an adjacent market. The case was significant because it treated data-sharing conditions as a potential competition issue, rather than regarding them exclusively as a matter of privacy or data protection law.

NCLAT’s November 2025 decision

In November 2025, the NCLAT upheld the principal findings of abuse of dominance and the ₹213.14 crore penalty. However, it set aside the five-year restriction imposed by the CCI on sharing WhatsApp user data with other Meta companies for advertising purposes. It also set aside the CCI’s finding of unlawful leveraging under Section 4(2)(e).

The Tribunal retained important directions concerning transparency and user choice in relation to data sharing for purposes beyond providing WhatsApp services. In December 2025, it clarified the application of these directions to non-WhatsApp uses of user data, including advertising-related uses. The distinction is important: the appellate outcome did not eliminate competition law scrutiny of WhatsApp’s data-sharing arrangements, but it modified the remedies and findings made by the CCI.

Implications for digital businesses

The proceedings illustrate that privacy-related conduct may have competition law implications when it affects user choice, the quality of a service or the competitive advantages available to businesses in related markets.

This does not mean that every privacy-policy dispute constitutes an abuse of dominance. The CCI must examine the relevant market, the enterprise’s dominant position and whether the conduct falls within Section 4.

Competition law and data protection law address different legal questions, even where the underlying conduct overlaps. Businesses should therefore assess data collection, sharing and consent arrangements under the applicable legal frameworks rather than assuming that compliance with one necessarily resolves issues arising under the other.

Self-Preferencing and Access to Digital Markets

Self-preferencing occurs when a platform gives preferential treatment to its own products or services over those offered by competing businesses using the same platform.

An e-commerce marketplace may, for example, influence the visibility of its own offerings relative to independent sellers. A search engine may prioritise its own specialised services, while an app store may impose conditions that affect competing applications. Such conduct may raise competition concerns where the platform has substantial market power and controls an important route through which competitors reach consumers.

Under Indian law, the relevant provisions may include Section 4(2)(a), concerning unfair or discriminatory conditions; Section 4(2)(c), concerning denial of market access; and Section 4(2)(e), concerning the use of dominance in one relevant market to enter into or protect another. However, preferential treatment is not automatically unlawful. Platforms may have legitimate reasons for organising search results, ranking products or integrating services. The assessment must distinguish competition on the merits from conduct that improperly exploits market power or forecloses competitors.

For businesses operating through digital marketplaces, the terms governing visibility, commissions, access to customer data and participation in platform services may therefore be relevant to a competition law assessment.

Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023: Deal Value Threshold and Digital Acquisitions

The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 introduced significant changes to India’s merger control framework. One development particularly relevant to digital markets is the deal value threshold.

Under Section 5(d) of the Competition Act, a transaction may be notifiable where its value exceeds ₹2,000 crore and the enterprise being acquired, taken control of, merged or amalgamated has substantial business operations in India, subject to the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.

The threshold addresses a potential gap in traditional merger control. A technology startup may possess valuable intellectual property, user data, technology or an innovative product despite having relatively low assets or turnover. An acquisition of such a business may therefore warrant examination even where conventional financial thresholds are not met.

The deal value threshold is relevant to digital acquisitions, including transactions involving technology businesses and emerging competitors. However, it does not mean that every acquisition of a startup is automatically notifiable or that every acquisition of an innovative business is anticompetitive. The statutory requirements, applicable exemptions and transaction-specific facts must be examined.

The 2023 amendments also introduced settlement and commitment mechanisms for specified proceedings concerning anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, subject to the conditions prescribed by the Act. These mechanisms can provide alternatives to a fully contested proceeding in eligible cases, although their availability and suitability depend on the nature and stage of the matter.

India’s Proposed Digital Competition Bill, 2024

The Competition Act principally operates through an ex-post framework: the CCI examines conduct and determines whether it contravenes the law. In rapidly evolving digital markets, concerns have been raised that intervention after an investigation may come too late to prevent certain forms of market foreclosure.

In February 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted the Committee on Digital Competition Law to examine the need for a separate ex-ante framework for digital markets. In March 2024, the Committee recommended a new legislative framework and published the draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024.

The proposed framework envisages obligations for designated Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs) operating specified Core Digital Services. Its approach is intended to supplement the existing competition law regime by imposing defined obligations on enterprises meeting the applicable criteria.

The proposed obligations address areas such as self-preferencing, restrictions on business users, tying and bundling, data use and interoperability. The precise scope and application of any such obligations would depend on the legislation and regulations ultimately adopted.

The proposed Bill should not be treated as an enacted statute merely because a draft has been published. Until a separate framework is enacted and brought into force, the existing Competition Act remains the principal statutory basis for examining abuse of dominant position in India.

Considerations for businesses

A separate ex-ante regime could change compliance expectations for large digital platforms by requiring them to assess specified practices before engaging in them, rather than relying exclusively on the outcome of enforcement proceedings. At the same time, the scope of any new framework will matter. Businesses will need clarity on designation criteria, the services covered, applicable obligations, enforcement powers and the interaction between the proposed regime and the Competition Act.

For technology companies, app developers, digital marketplaces and investors, monitoring developments in digital competition regulation is therefore relevant to commercial strategy, contractual arrangements and transaction planning.

Conclusion

The regulation of abuse of dominant position in digital markets in India is evolving through the application of established competition law principles to new business models and the consideration of a separate ex-ante framework for large digital enterprises.

The CCI’s proceedings against Google demonstrate how app distribution, pre-installation arrangements, payment systems and contractual restrictions may be examined under Section 4 of the Competition Act. The Meta-WhatsApp proceedings illustrate how data-sharing conditions and user choice may raise competition concerns where they interact with market power and competitive advantages in related markets. The deal value threshold introduced by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 also strengthens the relevance of merger control to certain acquisitions involving digital businesses.

These developments do not make size, data ownership or commercial success unlawful. Rather, they underscore the need to distinguish legitimate competition on the merits from conduct that abuses market power to impose unfair conditions, restrict market access or impede effective competition.

For businesses operating in India’s digital economy, a careful assessment of market position, platform agreements, data practices, payment arrangements and proposed acquisitions can help identify potential competition law issues at an early stage. The applicable legal analysis will continue to depend on the statutory framework, the relevant market and the facts of each case.

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Last Updated on 16 October, 2026