Anti-Trust Violations: Case Studies And Lessons Learned Under Competition Law

Posted On - 18 February, 2026 • By - Aniket Ghosh

India’s antitrust authority’s framework is based on a foundation established through the Competition Act, 2002, which seeks to remove practices that are found to cause an “appreciable adverse effect on competition” and, instead, promote consumer welfare and free trade. Interestingly, this Competition Act deliberately refers to an “effects-based approach,” effectively distinguishing it from structural intervention associated with MRTP. The Act is primarily interested in behavior and its ensuing impact rather than size and market share.

The statutory architecture rests primarily on three substantive pillars:

  • Section 3 prohibits Anti-competitive agreements;
  • Section 4 prevents Abuse of dominant position;
  • Sections 5 and 6 relating to Combinations, for instance, Mergers and Acquisitions.

These sections are enforced by the Competition Commission of India under Sections 18 and 19, with appellate power now lying with the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. The judicial construction on sections 18 and 19 has significantly contributed to the development of anti-trust law in India, especially in the increasingly complicated field of competition.

Anti-Competitive Agreements under Section 3: The Law Against Collusion

Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits agreements that cause, or are likely to cause, an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) within India. While Section 3(1) sets out the general prohibition against anti-competitive agreements, Section 3(3) specifically addresses horizontal agreements between competitors, including arrangements relating to price-fixing, output restriction, market allocation, and bid rigging.

Notably, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption of AAEC for agreements falling within Section 3(3). This reflects a legislative recognition that cartels are inherently harmful to market competition and rarely yield pro-competitive benefits.

In enforcing these provisions, the Competition Commission of India adopts a substance-over-form approach. Cartel conduct is assessed on the basis of factual and economic analysis rather than the existence of formal, contract-like arrangements. The absence of a written agreement does not preclude a finding of collusion; instead, the Commission evaluates the duration of the alleged conduct, patterns of coordination, and surrounding market circumstances to determine whether a concerted practice exists.

Cartel jurisprudence thus demonstrates that competition law operates beyond the traditional boundaries of contract law. In the well-known cement cartel investigations, the Commission relied on circumstantial evidence such as parallel pricing behaviour, capacity utilisation trends, and other indirect indicators of coordination. This evidentiary approach is consistent with international practice. For instance, enforcement actions undertaken by the European Commission in industrial cartel cases have similarly underscored that anti-competitive agreements may arise through informal understandings or tacit coordination, without the need for formalised written arrangements.

Enforcement of Cartel under Section 3 reveals that there are three general principles, from a legal perspective:

  • Direct evidence of agreement is not required;
  • The circumstantial and economic evidence is sufficient,
  • Intent is secondary to the effect on competition.

Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. Dominance is defined as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise that enables it to operate independently of competitive forces or to affect competitors or consumers in its favour. Crucially, the law does not penalise dominance per se; it is the abuse of such dominance that attracts liability.

The analytical framework under Section 4 involves a structured, two-step inquiry. First, the relevant market is delineated in accordance with Sections 19(5)–(7), which consider factors such as substitutability, consumer preferences, and geographic scope. Second, dominance is assessed under Section 19(4), taking into account market share, entry barriers, economic power, vertical integration, and the degree of consumer dependence. Only upon establishing dominance does the inquiry proceed to examine whether the conduct in question amounts to abuse under Section 4(2).

Abusive conduct may manifest in subtle and indirect ways. In the Google Android decision, the Competition Commission of India held that mandatory pre-installation conditions and restrictions imposed on original equipment manufacturers, which limited the development or deployment of rival operating systems, constituted abuse under Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c). The conduct did not involve overt exclusion through pricing strategies; rather, it operated through restrictive contractual arrangements that foreclosed market access and reinforced dominance.

Similarly, in the DLF matter, the Commission found that the imposition of one-sided and unfair contractual terms on flat purchasers amounted to abusive conduct. Given DLF’s dominant position and the absence of meaningful consumer choice, such unilateral conditions were held to distort the competitive process. These decisions underscore that abuse need not be confined to predatory pricing or explicit exclusionary tactics. Unilateral conduct by a dominant enterprise particularly where it exploits consumer dependence or restricts market access may suffice to establish a violation under Section 4.

The doctrinal teachings that can be derived from Section 4 case law are the following:

  • Dominance requires a stronger obligation of fairness;
  • Contractual imbalance may constitute an abuse;

Competition effects outweigh business reasons.

Predatory Pricing and Section 4(2)(a)(ii): Law and Economics

Predatory pricing is expressly recognised under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act, 2002, which prohibits a dominant enterprise from imposing unfair or discriminatory prices, including pricing below cost with the intent to reduce competition or eliminate competitors. The provision reflects the economic concern that sustained below-cost pricing by a dominant firm may distort market structure and foreclose rivals. Yet, as a matter of enforcement, predatory pricing remains one of the most complex and contested forms of abuse.

Competition law has traditionally exercised caution in characterising low prices as unlawful, given their immediate and apparent benefit to consumers. The challenge lies in distinguishing aggressive but legitimate competition from exclusionary pricing strategies designed to drive out competitors. In India, proceedings involving ride-sharing platforms such as Uber and Ola highlighted the difficulty of applying conventional cost benchmarks in digital and network-driven markets. Although early inquiries did not culminate in definitive findings of predation, they prompted a reassessment of how dominance, intent, and market power should be analysed in platform-based and venture-capital-funded ecosystems.

Globally, competition authorities have similarly grappled with adapting traditional predation tests to digital markets. The classical requirement of demonstrating a realistic prospect of recoupment has, in some jurisdictions, been reconsidered in light of business models built on data accumulation, network effects, and ecosystem integration. Investigations concerning large e-commerce platforms have increasingly focused on practices such as self-preferencing and targeted discounting, assessed within the broader framework of dominance and market foreclosure rather than through a narrow recoupment analysis alone.

These developments highlights that predatory pricing doctrine must evolve alongside market realities, balancing the need to preserve consumer welfare with the imperative of safeguarding competitive market structures.

The ever-changing legal position indicates that

  • Long-term exclusionary intent and market foreclosure are important.
  • Competition law must keep up with current trends and ensure that it covers and protects non-traditional business models.

Vertical Agreements and Market foreclosure Under Section 3(4)

In this regard Section 3(4) therefore applies to vertical agreements that contain exclusive supply, tie-in, or resale prices. Vertical agreements are assessed using the rule of reason, and therefore, they need to prove AAEC.

Through the experience in India, vertical restraints are a problem only where they are imposed by dominant or strategically placed undertakings. Among the most celebrated cases in antitrust law is the automobile spare parts market, where the OEMs imposed restrictions on the use of spare parts and diagnostic equipment, thus excluding the independents. This, according to the CCI, led to foreclosure of competition in the aftermarkets.

This jurisprudence confirms again that:

  • Efficiency explanations are pertinent but not dispositive;
  • Foreclosure effects are at the forefront;
  • Vertical control may also constitute abuse when it is accompanied by market power.

Power of enforcement by CCI under the Act:

  • Investigation by Director General (Section 26),
  • Imposing of penalties (Section 27),
  • Issuance of cease-and-desist orders,
  • Modification of agreements,
  • Division, in extreme cases, of the dominant enterprise.

Under Section 46, leniency provisions exist that favor the whistleblower in cases of cartels. Recently, there have been legislative adjustments that promote settlement procedures/commitments, which witness an approach towards effective enforcement.

Further, appellate review by NCLAT and the Supreme Court has also clarified standards of competition laws, especially with respect to issues concerning procedural justice, proportionality of fines, and thresholds of evidence.

Compliance Lessons and Policy Implications

Case studies on antitrust, with a focus on legal compliance, emphasize the importance of internal mechanisms. Companies are therefore required to identify risks under competition laws, especially those with market power, with regard to issues like pricing, agreements, platform regulation, and data.

For policy-makers, these cases raise the issue of adaptiveness in the application of regulation. With evolved markets because of digitization and global integration, there must be adaptability in competition policy that does not affect the clarity of principles.

Conclusion

Anti-competitive agreements that contravene the provision of the Competition Act, 2002, precipitate how, if left unregulated, market power would impact competition by engaging in collusive, exclusionary, and unfair practices. Case studies on judicial and regulatory enforcement manifest an evolutionary journey in moving towards an effects-based, economically informed approach. Enshrined in the statutory provision and market imperatives, Indian competition policy fosters innovation within fairness.

It can be learned that all the lessons inferred are guiding principles that are applicable to the regulators, corporations, and even courts. Efficient anti-trust enforcement will eventually lead to market efficiency and innovation rather than market manipulation.