Levelling the Playing Field: India’s Competition Act in a Global Perspective

Posted On - 14 February, 2026 • By - Aniket Ghosh

Introduction

Competition law is no longer a domestic regulatory tool but a cornerstone of global economic governance. In an era defined by digital platforms, cross-border mergers, data concentration, and algorithmic pricing, antitrust enforcement determines not only market structure but also innovation trajectories and geopolitical leverage. India’s Competition Act, 2002 (as amended in 2023) represents a decisive shift from the command-and-control framework of the MRTP era to a modern, effects-based competition regime aligned with global standards.

The Global Architecture of Competition Law

Modern antitrust systems converge around three core pillars:

  1. Prohibition of anti-competitive agreements (cartels and restrictive vertical arrangements)
  2. Control of abuse of dominance / monopolization
  3. Merger control to prevent excessive concentration

Yet jurisdictions differ in philosophy and enforcement intensity.

  • The United States traditionally prioritizes consumer welfare and economic efficiency, rooted in the Sherman Act, Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act.
  • The European Union adopts a more structural approach under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), emphasizing market integration and fairness alongside consumer welfare.
  • India’s framework under the Competition Act, 2002 increasingly blends both approaches while adapting to its developmental and digital economy priorities.

India’s Competition Act, 2002: Structure and Philosophy

ndia replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 with a forward-looking statute aimed at promoting competition rather than merely curbing concentration. The Act establishes the Competition Commission of India (CCI) as the primary enforcement authority.

1. Anti-Competitive Agreements (Section 3)

Section 3 prohibits agreements that cause or are likely to cause an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC).

  • Horizontal agreements (cartels, bid rigging, price-fixing) are presumed anti-competitive.
  • Vertical agreements (exclusive supply, resale price maintenance, tying) are assessed under a rule-of-reason analysis.

2. Abuse of Dominance (Section 4)

Dominance per se is not unlawful but abuse is. The Act prohibits:

  • Predatory pricing
  • Denial of market access
  • Imposition of unfair conditions
  • Leveraging dominance into adjacent markets

3. Merger Control (Sections 5 & 6)

India follows a mandatory ex-ante notification regime for combinations crossing asset/turnover thresholds. The 2023 amendments introduced a deal value threshold, aligning India with jurisdictions like the EU and Germany to capture high-value digital acquisitions involving data-rich but low-revenue targets.

The CCI evaluates whether a merger causes a “substantial adverse effect on competition” (SAEC), applying economic tools including HHI analysis, entry barriers assessment, and countervailing buyer power evaluation.

Comparative Perspective: India, US, and EU

US Antitrust Framework

The United States’ antitrust framework is comprised of three primary pieces of legislation:

  • Sherman Act (1890)- Prohibits monopolistic activities and cartels from forming.1
  • Clayton Act (1914)- Addresses “Acts Specific” to address merger activity, price discrimination and exclusive dealing.2
  • FTC Act (1914)- Establishes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the body responsible for the enforcement of US antitrust laws.

Comparative Analysis: The U.S. antitrust system, administered by the DOJ and FTC, is litigation-driven and heavily influenced by Chicago School economics. Enforcement historically emphasized price effects and efficiency gains. However, recent developments signal a shift toward structural concerns in Big Tech markets. Unlike India, the U.S. does not have mandatory pre-merger approval in all cases but operates under the Hart-Scott-Rodino framework for notification.

European Union

The EU’s competition regime under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is interventionist and structural. The European Commission has led aggressive enforcement against digital gatekeepers. The enactment of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) introduces ex-ante obligations for large platforms, a regulatory move beyond traditional antitrust.

India’s 2023 amendments particularly provisions on settlements, commitments, and expanded investigative powers indicate a similar willingness to adopt forward-looking regulatory tools.

Digital Markets and the New Antitrust Frontier

Digital markets challenge traditional competition metrics due to:

  • Network effects
  • Zero-price services
  • Data concentration
  • Algorithmic pricing
  • Cross-market leveraging

India’s enforcement actions against Google in Android and Play Store markets reflect an ecosystem-based analysis similar to EU jurisprudence. The CCI increasingly recognizes that control over operating systems, app stores, and data flows can create structural barriers to entry.

The introduction of settlement and commitment mechanisms under the 2023 amendments improves regulatory flexibility while reducing litigation uncertainty, a move aligned with global trends.

Institutional and Enforcement Challenges

Despite doctrinal alignment with global standards, India faces structural challenges:

  1. Capacity and Economic Expertise – Complex digital investigations require advanced data analytics capabilities.
  2. Judicial Delays – Appeals before the NCLAT and Supreme Court can delay finality.
  3. Global Coordination – Cross-border cartels and Big Tech investigations require regulatory cooperation.
  4. Balancing Innovation and Enforcement – Over-regulation risks chilling investment in emerging sectors.

Key Judicial and Regulatory Milestones

  • Cement cartel and auto parts cartel decisions strengthened India’s deterrence framework.
  • Digital platform investigations signaled willingness to scrutinize global technology giants.
  • Merger remedies in telecom and media markets show alignment with EU-style structural and behavioral commitments.

The Supreme Court’s affirmation of CCI’s investigative authority reinforced institutional credibility and autonomy.

Strategic Outlook: Where India Stands

India’s Competition Act today stands at a strategic inflection point. With one of the world’s largest digital consumer bases, India cannot rely solely on reactive enforcement. It must:

  • Build economic and technological expertise within the CCI
  • Enhance international cooperation
  • Develop sector-specific digital competition guidelines
  • Ensure faster appellate resolution

Crucially, India’s competition policy must balance three competing imperatives:

  1. Protecting consumer welfare
  2. Encouraging domestic innovation and scale
  3. Preventing entrenched digital gatekeepers

Conclusion

India’s Competition Act, 2002 has evolved into a globally aligned yet locally contextualized antitrust regime. While borrowing structural elements from U.S. and EU models, India increasingly charts its own path particularly in digital markets and merger control innovation.

As competition law becomes central to regulating data power, platform dominance, and cross-border consolidation, India’s enforcement trajectory will influence not only domestic markets but also the broader architecture of global antitrust governance.

The next decade will determine whether India transitions from a rule-adopting jurisdiction to a rule-shaping one in the global competition law ecosystem.

  1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (1890) ↩︎
  2. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (1914). ↩︎