Changing Selection Criteria after the Interview Stage: Why Courts View It as a Violation of Fair Recruitment 

Introduction

Fairness in public employment is a constitutional mandate emanating from Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. Government recruitment processes must, therefore, be rigorously conducted with transparency, equality of opportunity, and predictability. These values ensure that candidates undergo a selection process knowing exactly what standard they must meet. Among the most settled principles of service jurisprudence is that the “rules of the game”, that is, eligibility norms, evaluation schemes, and selection criteria cannot be amended after the selection process has commenced, much less after it has ended. Any such attempt is fraught with the risk of an element of arbitrariness seeping into a system that ought to remain neutral and objective. 

Against this background, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in J&K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar & Ors. 2025 reiterates this basic tenet. The question involved the recruitment of Foresters in Jammu & Kashmir, where the Selection Board changed the criteria for evaluation after the interviews were completed. Though the judgment itself pertains to a specific factual matrix, the legal question it raises, whether a recruiting body can alter the parameters of evaluation midway through the process, is of wide ramifications for recruitment processes all over India. 

Issue

Can the selection criteria be modified after the final stage of evaluation? 

The question basically is one of doctrine: Whether the amendment in the evaluation criteria, after candidates have completed their participation in the selection process, is permissible? Supreme Court jurisprudence has an unequivocal answer-no. Doing so would violate the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness, create inequalities among similarly situated candidates, and compromise the integrity of the recruitment process. 

This situation becomes particularly problematic when the change disadvantages candidates who might have legitimately believed that they met the standards at the time of application. When candidates sit for exams or interviews under a particular scheme, they expect to be judged on those terms alone. Changing the criteria after the interview or final stage distorts expectations and can elevate or depress candidates’ merit positions in an arbitrary fashion. 

Petitioner’s Arguments

Those opposing mid-process alterations-traditionally the Court’s own view-advance several core arguments. First, fairness requires that all candidates be assessed under the same pre-determined standards; once selection begins, and especially after interviews have been conducted, the scope for manipulation increases dramatically if authorities can retroactively adjust criteria.  

Second, changes after the fact create retroactive inequities. Candidates who have passed all phases cannot retroactively adjust their academic or physical qualifications in midstream. Thus, a new standard simply punishes them for not having qualifications that no one was required to have when they first applied. Third, these changes provide avenues for influence and selective advantage. As the Supreme Court held in Sudesh Kumar, alteration of criteria, based on representations by some candidates, seriously erodes the aspect of transparency and non-arbitrariness. Evaluation frameworks must be designed for objective assessment, not negotiated at later stages. Fourth, settled precedent, extending between decisions such as K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh to the Constitution Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, has consistently rejected changes to benchmarks after the commencement of selection, unless expressly authorized by statutory rules. Thus, both from a perspective of fairness and a constitutional one, changes in one’s condition after the interview undermine the legitimacy of public recruitment. 

Respondent’s Arguments

Why the J&K Board Claimed the Change Was Justified – In the Sudesh Kumar case, the J&K Service Selection Board also claimed that the revision had been made without changing the eligibility but only as a modification in the method of valuation. As against a B.Sc. Forestry course, which earlier carried 25 points, after the interviews were over, the Board divided the degree-holders into two categories depending upon the duration, namely, a 3-year course was awarded 20 points and a 4-year course 25 points. According to the Board, such differentiation was based on the qualitative difference between the two degrees and thus satisfied the objective of rewarding better academic training. 

Further, the Board argued that: 

1. Representations had highlighted real differences between the two-degree courses and, therefore, amendments to the matrix were necessary. 

2. Giving extra points to the longer course was reasonable since it arguably entailed deeper academic exposure. 

3. The amendment did not affect the basic eligibility-both sets of candidates continued to be eligible, and minimum educational requirement was only 10 + 2 with science. 

4. No malafide intention was shown, and the objective was to refine the selection procedure for better merit differentiation. 

The Board thus contended that the amendment was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional but a valid refinement considering newly discovered information. 

Judgement Analysis

Supreme Court Reaffirmation of Fairness in Recruitment. The Supreme Court rejected the Board’s contention on the issue while holding that such action could not be justified in law or on constitutional principle. The Court has reiterated that once candidates complete all stages of evaluation, the authority cannot introduce changes that affect merit rankings or thresholds to eligibility. 

Drawing from the judgment pp. 2–7, the Court gave a number of reasons: 

1. The change occurred after interviews, i.e., the final stage of assessment – The Court held that while the candidates were still attending the interviews, the evaluation scheme provided that a B.Sc. Forestry degree would attract 25 marks regardless of the duration of the course. Changing it after the last stage of evaluation frustrated equal evaluation. 

2. Candidate representations led to the modification – This raised questions about the neutrality of the recruitment authority. A system where criteria shift owing to external pressure cannot be regarded as transparent. 

3. The change did not have rational nexus to the post -The minimum academic qualification was only 10+2 with science, and the Forester post emphasized physical attributes and viva voce performance. In that context, the differentiation between 3- and 4-year degrees did not meet the selection objective. 

4. The principle in Tej Prakash Pathak applies squarely -The Constitution Bench had approved K. Manjusree and held that recruitment norms cannot be altered after the selection process begins, unless the governing rules expressly allow it, which was not the case here. 

5. Retrospective re-evaluation introduces arbitrariness -The candidates with three-year degrees had already participated fully, believing that their qualifications carried equal weight. Changing the matrix retrospectively was disadvantageous to them. 

6. Stability in public employment could not be ignored – The High Court had expressed apprehension-which found acceptance in the Supreme Court-that removing candidates who were already appointed and served for years and crossed the age bar for re-employment would be too harsh. The appropriate relief was to create additional posts for the aggrieved candidates. 

Conclusion

The judgment in J&K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar reaffirms one of the most basic rules on recruitment, in public law, that after the selection process reaches its terminal stage, no variation is permitted in the selection criteria. The reasoning of the Supreme Court travels beyond the dispute at hand and reinforces a structural safeguard intrinsic to good governance. By emphasizing transparency, predictability, and equality of treatment, the Court protects not just individual candidates but the legitimacy of public recruitment as a whole. Governments and selection boards must ensure that their procedures remain immune from ad-hoc changes, external influences, or retrospective reinterpretations.  

Any deviation is not only unfair but constitutionally impermissible. By treating the doctrine of fairness in recruitment as inviolable, the Court reminds us that public employment is not merely a bureaucratic exercise; rather, it is a constitutional responsibility. The ruling in Sudesh Kumar thus stands as an important reminder that integrity in selection processes is indispensable to public trust, equality, and the rule of law.