RTE Act | State Cannot Justify Low Pay to Instructors by Citing Delay in Central Funds

Posted On - 27 April, 2026 • By - Gaurav Singh Gaur

Introduction

India guarantees every child between the ages of six and fourteen the right to free and compulsory education under Article 21A of the Constitution, operationalised through the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act). The financial responsibility for implementing the Act is shared between the Union and the States, including funding for schemes such as the engagement of part-time instructors in upper primary schools for art, physical education, and work education.

However, these instructors have historically been paid modest honoraria. States have often justified the low payments by citing delays or shortfalls in the release of funds by the Central Government.

In its judgment dated February 4, 2026, in U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.1, the Supreme Court addressed this issue. A Bench comprising Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale held that Section 7(5) of the RTE Act places the ultimate financial responsibility on the State, irrespective of delays in central assistance. The Court further examined whether persistently low honoraria could, in certain circumstances, offend Article 23 of the Constitution, which prohibits forced labour.

Statutory & Doctrinal Framework

Right to Education and the RTE Act

The recognition of education as a fundamental right evolved through judicial interpretation in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) and Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993)2, where the Supreme Court linked education to the right to life under Article 21. This led to the constitutional insertion of Article 21A.

The RTE Act, 2009 gives effect to this right.

Section 7 of the Act deals with financial responsibility:

  • The Centre and States share costs (Section 7(1)).
  • The Centre prepares estimates in consultation with States (Section 7(3)).
  • Central grants are provided (Section 7(4)).
  • Crucially, Section 7(5) stipulates that a State Government shall provide funds for implementation of the Act, even if central assistance is not fully forthcoming.

This provision formed the backbone of the Court’s reasoning.

Article 23 and the Concept of Forced Labour

Article 23 prohibits “begar” and other forms of forced labour.

In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)3, the Supreme Court held that payment below minimum wages may amount to forced labour, as economic compulsion can negate genuine consent.

However, it is important to note doctrinal nuance:

  • Not every instance of low remuneration automatically constitutes “begar”.
  • The threshold generally involves payment below statutory minimum wages or exploitative conditions coupled with compulsion.

The present judgment builds on this principle but must be read within these established limits.

Policy Context: SSA / Samagra Shiksha

Under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) (now subsumed under Samagra Shiksha), part-time instructors were engaged on contractual terms.

  • Earlier honorarium: ~₹7,000 per month (2013–14)
  • Revised by Project Approval Board (PAB): ~₹17,000 (2017–18)

Despite this, Uttar Pradesh continued to pay lower amounts, citing inadequate central funding, leading to litigation.

The Judgment

Key Issues:

  • Whether instructors were entitled to the revised honorarium recommended under the SSA framework.
  • Whether the State could deny revised payment due to non-release of central funds.
  • Whether continued payment of low honorarium violated constitutional protections, including Article 23.

Court’s Reasoning

1. State’s Financial Obligation under Section 7(5)

The Court held that Section 7(5) imposes a binding obligation on the State to ensure implementation of the RTE Act.

The State cannot evade this duty by citing delays in central funding. It must:

  • Arrange funds from its own resources if necessary, and
  • Seek reimbursement or adjustment from the Centre subsequently (often described as a “pay and recover” approach).

2. Nature of Employment

The Court took note of the long and continuous engagement of instructors, in some cases extending over a decade. However, the judgment does not amount to a blanket declaration of regularisation or permanent status in the strict service law sense. Instead, the Court recognised:

  • The substantive and ongoing nature of their engagement, and
  • The State’s dependence on their services,

to justify entitlement to fair and reasonable remuneration, even within a contractual framework. This distinction is important to remain consistent with precedents such as State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006).

3. Adequacy of Honorarium and Article 23

The Court strongly criticised the continued payment of significantly lower honoraria despite revised approvals. While drawing from PUDR, the Court indicated that grossly inadequate remuneration in a State-controlled scheme may raise concerns under Article 23, particularly where:

  • Workers have limited bargaining power, and
  • The State continues to extract labour under inequitable conditions.

That said, the ruling should be read as context-specific, and not as establishing that all honorarium-based engagements below a certain level automatically amount to “begar”.

4. Role of the Project Approval Board (PAB)

The Court treated the PAB-approved honorarium as the relevant benchmark within the SSA framework. However, it would be more accurate to interpret this as:

  • A binding norm within the scheme’s financial structure, rather than
  • An absolute or exclusive statutory authority overriding all State discretion in every context.

Operative Directions

The Court, in substance:

  • Directed the State to comply with the honorarium structure approved under the SSA framework (₹17,000).
  • Rejected the defence based on non-release of central funds.
  • Emphasised the need for timely and fair revision of honoraria.
  • Directed payment of arrears, subject to the terms specified in the judgment.
  • Recognised that prolonged underpayment in such circumstances may raise constitutional concerns.

Position In Existing Jurisprudence

The ruling aligns with established principles:

  • Right to Education: Unni Krishnan → Article 21 → Article 21A → RTE Act
  • State cannot cite financial constraints: State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder
  • Forced labour doctrine: PUDR

At the same time, it carefully avoids direct conflict with Umadevi by not ordering wholesale regularisation. The judgment strengthens the principle that: Administrative or fiscal arrangements between governments cannot dilute enforceable rights or statutory obligations.

Conclusion

This judgment aligns squarely with the Supreme Court’s established approach to education and labour rights. In Unni Krishnan, the Court recognized that education is part of the right to life under Article 21. Article 21A and the RTE Act later made that right explicit. In State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder4, the Court stated that financial constraints cannot justify denying fundamental rights. Earlier cases like PUDR and Santhosh Mehta v. State of Bihar held that paying below minimum wage constitutes forced labour under Article 23. Now, the Supreme Court has extended those protections to honoraria paid under government schemes.

By interpreting Section 7(5) in this manner, the Court clarified the State’s responsibilities. Some High Courts had permitted states to wait for central funds, but the Supreme Court put an end to that. Instructors and students should not suffer because governments fail to coordinate. This decision helps maintain the smooth functioning of education and ensures instructors are not left unsupported.

Some may perceive a contradiction with the Court’s earlier caution in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi5 against regularizing ad-hoc employees. However, the judges noted the distinction: these instructors were properly selected and had served continuously, making their positions real rather than ad-hoc. The Court also relied on the “pay and recover” principle from cases like Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust v. Ashok Kumar Jain, stating that the State must pay now and sort out the central share later.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces that States bear primary responsibility for implementing the RTE Act, irrespective of delays in central funding.

It clarifies that:

  • Fiscal federal arrangements cannot be used to justify non-compliance with statutory duties, and
  • Persistently inadequate remuneration in State-run schemes may invite constitutional scrutiny, particularly under Article 23 in extreme cases.

While the judgment stops short of granting formal regularisation, it significantly strengthens protections for scheme-based workers by insisting on fair, scheme-consistent compensation.

Its broader impact lies in signalling that rights-based welfare legislation must be backed by real financial commitment, not contingent excuses.

  1. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of U.P., Supreme Court of India, judgment dated 04.02.2026 ↩︎
  2. Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645 ↩︎
  3. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235 ↩︎
  4. State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737 ↩︎
  5. State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1 ↩︎