Supreme Court Strikes Down Tribunals Reforms Act 2021

Introduction

Tribunals play an integral part in the Indian justice delivery system by providing specialized adjudication in fields as diverse as tax and competition to consumer disputes and environmental law. For a long period, their independence has been a constitutional concern because they perform adjudicatory functions, but appointments and service conditions are often controlled by the executive. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that tribunals must enjoy security of tenure, financial independence, and transparent appointments if the constitutional mandate of judicial independence is to be satisfied. In August 2021, Parliament enacted the Tribunals Reforms Act, which attempted to restructure tribunals and standardize service conditions. However, many provisions mirrored an ordinance which the Supreme Court had invalidated only a few months earlier. Soon, bar associations and lawyers challenged the Act as an impermissible legislative override of the Court’s judgments and as an assault on the independence of tribunals. In a landmark judgment delivered in 2024, the Supreme Court struck down key sections of the Act and directed the government to establish a National Tribunals Commission.

The Core Issue

The central question, then, before the Court was whether Parliament could enact a legislation that reinstated provisions which the Supreme Court had struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that they eroded judicial independence.  The 2021 Act stipulated a minimum age of 50 years for the appointment of tribunal members; gave them a tenure limited to four years and accorded the executive a dominant position in selection committees. It also permitted the government to grant extensions. Each of the above provisions was identical to those invalidated in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India where the Court held that a four-year tenure and dominance in appointments by the executive was violative of the doctrine of separation of power and independence of the judiciary. The petitioners thus argued that the legislature’s re-enactment of provisions already held to be invalid was a legislative override of binding judgments and a blow to constitutional supremacy.

Arguments of Petitioner

The writ petitions were filed by the bar associations, represented by the Madras Bar Association and the Central Administrative Tribunal Bar Association, with several senior advocates appearing in support.  The petitioners argued that the impugned provisions were word-for-word reproductions of earlier ordinances, which had been set aside by the Court. They averred that fixing a minimum age of 50 and tenure of only four years prevented young lawyers of calibre applying for the selection process and resulted in a constant churn of members, impairing institutional memory. They also took objections to the inclusion of senior bureaucrats on the search cum selection committee as this gave too much control over judicial appointments to the executive and would violate Article 50 of the Constitution, which provides for separation of the judiciary from the executive. They pointed out that in judgments such as Rojer Mathew (2019) and Madras Bar Association (2020), the Court had directed the government to assure a tenure of five years and to let the judiciary have a decisive voice in appointments. Parliament had tried to circumvent judicial review by reenacting already invalidated provisions and had thereby violated the basic structure of the Constitution.

Respondent’s Arguments

The Union government defended the Act on the ground that Parliament has plenary power to legislate upon entries relating to tribunals under Articles 323 A and 323 B.  It contended that what the Act aimed to achieve was the rationalization of tribunals and a reduction in their numbers, bringing about efficiency in administration. According to the government, the minimum age requirement ensured that only experienced advocates and judges, who would command respect, could be appointed. Similarly, the four-year tenure, though shorter than the five-year term suggested by the Court, was justified on the ground that it allowed periodic infusion of fresh talent. The government also contended that the search cum selection committee provided for representation of both the executive and the judiciary and that executive participation does not necessarily undermine independence. The Attorney General, appearing for the Union Government, submitted that legislative supremacy allows Parliament to re enact a law even after judicial invalidation, provided it cures the defects noted by the Court. The government maintained that the Act did indeed address concerns raised in earlier judgments by providing for reappointment and by reducing the number of tribunals, thereby facilitating administrative efficiency.

Judgment

A two-judge bench, comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, delivered the judgment.  The Court began by underlining the doctrine of separation of powers and constitutional supremacy of judicial decisions. It noted that though Parliament had competence to legislate, it could not enact a law which essentially set aside a judgment by re-introducing provisions which had been struck down as unconstitutional. The Court found that Sections 3(1) and 3(7) of the 2021 Act-prescribing minimum age for appointment of 50 years and tenure for four years-violated the principle of judicial independence since they ran contrary to the earlier judgments, which had prescribed a five-year tenure and had specified only a 50-year threshold.

The bench observed that the independence of tribunals is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be compromised on the grounds of administrative convenience. The Court further held that giving the executive primacy in the selection committee undermines the judiciary’s role in appointments and contravenes the requirement that judges must have a decisive voice.  It rejected the government’s argument that the Act cured defects found in previous ordinances; instead, it found that the impugned provisions were “replica like” reproductions of those invalidated earlier.  The bench has ruled that Parliament cannot neutralise constitutional judgments through backdoor legislation and that legislative supremacy is subject to constitutional limitations.  Quoting from the judgment in Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1992), it has said that a law repugnant to a constitutional interpretation must be struck down.

Analysis

In a related direction, the Court asked the government to constitute within four months a National Tribunals Commission to oversee appointments, reappointments, and service conditions. It clarified that such an independent body was required to insulate tribunals from the influence of the executive and to standardize procedures in the functioning of various tribunals. The Commission, besides recommending suitable candidates, would evaluate the performance and ensure that tribunals function with independence and efficiency. The Court ordered that all tribunals would continue to function in accordance with the earlier judgments, particularly the guidelines issued in Rojer Mathew and Madras Bar Association cases, until new legislation came into being. It granted liberty to the government to bring fresh legislation consistent with the constitutional norms but warned that any such attempt to revive the invalidated provisions would not be countenanced.

Conclusion

Striking down the Tribunals Reforms Act 2021 and ordering the establishment of a National Tribunals Commission, the Supreme Court has reasserted its role as the sentinel of judicial independence.  This judgment sends a clear message that legislative efforts to erode the autonomy of tribunals will not pass constitutional muster.  The ruling reiterates that independence of tribunals is part of the basic structure, and that parliamentary supremacy cannot be used to subvert judicial verdicts.  The envisaged Commission holds out the prospect of structural reform that may depoliticize appointments and ensure career stability for members of tribunals. The judgment is a salutary reminder to the executive that reform of tribunal administration requires cooperation and not confrontation with the judiciary. The judgment further ensures continuity by holding that existing tribunals would continue to function in accordance with the guidelines laid down in earlier judgments. This judgment has the long-term potential to catalyse far-reaching reform of the tribunal system to bring it into accord with constitutional principles and international best practices.