Bail on Parity: Why Courts Cannot Treat It as an Automatic Right – A Study of the Supreme Court’s Clarification in Sagar v. State of UP

Introduction

The criminal justice system operates on a very delicate balance between the personal liberty of an accused and the societal interest in guaranteeing a trial that is fair yet unimpeded. The jurisprudence of bail, therefore, sits at a critical juncture where constitutional values often clash with concerns of public order and the integrity of the judicial process. Of the various grounds one invokes while seeking bail, perhaps the most frequently misapprehended and misapplied doctrine pertains to parity: an accused having a prima facie right to bail merely because a co-accused has already been enlarged.

While parity aims at furthering consistency and rule-bound, or non-discriminatory, judicial decisions, its mechanical application essentially dilutes the responsible scrutiny that becomes necessary for the evaluation of individual involvement, culpability, and the possibility of interference with the investigation or trial. The recent Supreme Court judgment in Sagar v State of UP (2025) constitutes an important corrective, relying on which the Supreme Court has clarified that the principle of parity cannot, per se, serve as a ground for grant of bail without examining the role attributed to the applicant as well as other valid conditions.

The Core Issue: Whether Bail Can Be Granted Solely on Parity

The debate essentially revolves around an apparently simple question: Whether an accused can be granted bail just because another co-accused is granted bail?

The Indian courts have always answered this question in the negative. This jurisprudence also underlines that parity is not an independent ground but a comparative one, available only after the court determines that the circumstances and role of the accused are substantially similar to the co-accused already enlarged on bail. Where the roles are different, or where the earlier bail order suffers from any infirmity, granting bail solely on parity becomes legally erroneous.

This view has been articulated by the Supreme Court at different points in time through various judgments, like Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Makwana (2021) and Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025). The Sagar judgment is part of this continuum because it emphatically holds that the parity principle cannot be used to circumvent questions of the gravity of offences, individual roles played, criminal antecedents, threat to witnesses, and the impact on trials.

Arguments for a Strict Standard for Parity

Those opposed to bail on grounds of mere parity argue that a loose or mechanical application of the principle threatens several foundational aspects of criminal procedure: First, parity cannot override the binding judicial obligation to determine whether release of the applicant is warranted by his individual conduct. As clarified in the judgment of the Supreme Court, parity must pertain to “position”, that is, the position of an accused in relation to the crime, and not merely his membership in the same offence. The mere fact that he is part of a group of accused persons does not homogenize the extent of participation.

Secondly, criminal liability under Sections 147, 148, 149, or 302 IPC often involves composite acts where conspiracy, instigation, common intention, or overt acts have large variations amongst individuals. In such cases, the principle of automatic grant of bail because some co-accused was released by itself tends to trivialize such distinctions. Thirdly, while the doctrine of consistency is important, it cannot be allowed to override the doctrine of prudence. Consistency is not about replicating earlier erroneous orders.

This is precisely the risk which the Supreme Court in Sagar noticed. The High Court had placed reliance solely on the fact that the father of the accused had earlier been granted bail. The Supreme Court had already set aside that order on the ground that it did not contain proper reasoning. Extension of bail to others on the basis of an order which no longer survives in law, therefore, could not be justified.

Respondent’s Arguments: Why Parity Was Claimed as a Valid Ground

The accused had argued in Sagar that he had no criminal antecedents and had been in jail since June 2024, and his father was granted bail earlier. They said the High Court had noted earlier that there was a similarity in the roles though not elaborated between him and his co-accused, and therefore he was entitled to the same benefit.

However, as the Supreme Court discussed, these arguments fell apart once the factual distinctions and earlier judicial findings had been carefully scrutinised. The respondent was not just a member of the group but had been the instigator, having requested a co-accused to shoot the victim. His position could therefore never be equated with that of the co-accused.

Judgment Analysis: Doctrinal Clarification by Supreme Court

The decision of the Supreme Court in Sagar v. State of UP  (2025) is a detailed reiteration of well-settled principles of law on the jurisprudence of bail. It stated categorically that:

“Parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted… Parity requires similarity in position, especially the role played in the offence, not merely similarity in charges.”

A close reading of the judgment yields several important doctrinal clarifications:

1. Parity is not an automatic or independent ground:

The Court has taken pains to emphasize that parity cannot override the duty to assess the case on its merits. While reasons can be brief, some reasoning must be recorded showing application of mind to all relevant considerations, such as the nature of allegations, severity of punishment, possibility of tampering with evidence, criminal history, and prima facie involvement.

2. Similarity of charges is not enough:

In Sagar, not only the accused seeking bail, Rajveer but also his co-accused Suresh Pal, who had already been granted bail, invoked the very same sections of the IPC. Their roles were, however, materially different inasmuch as Rajveer is said to have asked Aditya to shoot the victim, whereas Suresh Pal was a member of the group and issued earlier threats. Such factual distinctions defeat the claim of parity.

3. Parity cannot be based upon erroneous bail orders:

By the time Rajveer’s bail reached the Supreme Court, the earlier bail granted to co-accused Suresh Pal had already been quashed. The Court observed that extending parity from a non-existent bail order, one that the Supreme Court had declared illegal, was itself untenable.

4. High Courts must record reasons even in bail orders:

While orders on bail need not carry lengthy reasoning, they cannot be cryptic nor bereft of reasons to come to a particular conclusion. As the impugned order passed by the High Court in the case of Sagar demonstrates, it failed this test, and therefore, it cannot be allowed to stand.

5. Parity has to relate to the “position” of the accused:

The Court relied upon the dictionary definition and earlier cases in jurisprudence to emphasize that “position” refers to the nature of one’s participation and not mere association with the crime. The Court’s example, distinguishing a bystander, an instigator, one who strikes a blow, and one who fires a weapon, serves as a guideline for future cases.

Conclusion

The judgment in Sagar v. State of UP cements Indian bail jurisprudence on one critical aspect: it reinstates clarity into the doctrine of parity. It sends a strong message that parity cannot be used as a shortcut to bail in cases involving grave charges, such as murder. Judicial discretion in bail matters must remain informed, cautious, and rooted in a thorough assessment of individual culpability.

The holding also reinforces the more general principle that, although liberty is fundamental, it is not unfettered-not at least when its exercise creates a risk of grave prejudice to the fair administration of criminal justice. In readjusting the doctrine of parity to its correct dimensions, the Supreme Court guarantees that decisions respecting bail continue being both principled and just, not accidental or mechanically dictated. In this sense, Sagar does more than correct the High Court’s error, it fortifies an essential safeguard within criminal procedure: that justice must be tailored to individual conduct, not homogenised by superficial similarity.