Delhi High Court Judgment On Domain Name Fraud And Trademark Protection

Introduction

On 24 December 2025, the Delhi High Court delivered a detailed and far reaching judgment in clubbed matters, addressing the increasing misuse of well known trademarks through fraudulent domain names and websites. The judgment(s), authored by Hon’ble Justice Prathiba M. Singh, goes beyond a conventional trademark dispute and examines structural weaknesses in the domain name registration ecosystem, intermediary accountability, and the intersection of intellectual property protection with domain name fraud.

Several matters were clubbed for being of similar commercial nature instituted by various trademark owners. Collectively, these cases involved more than 1,100 infringing domain names, revealing a recurring pattern in which unknown entities registered domain names incorporating reputed trademarks and used them to deceive the public by offering fictitious franchise, distributorship, and employment opportunities.

Scope and Nature of the Fraud

The Court noted that the consequences of such fraudulent activities were not merely commercial but had serious public ramifications. Evidence placed on record demonstrated substantial financial losses suffered by unsuspecting individuals, with amounts ranging from a few lakhs to over Rs. 11 crores in certain cases. The fraudsters typically replicated official websites of brand owners, used deceptively similar domain names, and collected money through bank accounts opened using false or unverifiable credentials. Despite the grant of interim injunctions in several matters, infringing domain names continued to emerge during the pendency of proceedings, indicating the inadequacy of traditional enforcement mechanisms.

Issues Before the Court

Against this backdrop, the Court framed three central issues. First, it examined the extent of the obligations and liabilities of Domain Name Registrars (DNRs) in relation to infringing domain names registered through their platforms. Second, it considered what preventive and remedial measures could be directed against DNRs and Registry Operators to safeguard trademark rights and public interest. Third, it analysed the consequences of continued noncompliance with judicial orders by DNRs, particularly those operating from foreign jurisdictions.

Domain Name Ecosystem and Registrar Conduct

The judgment undertakes a detailed examination of the domain name ecosystem, describing it as a hierarchical structure with ICANN at the apex, followed by Registry Operators, DNRs, and Registrants. While contractual arrangements within this system impose duties relating to verification of registrant details, maintenance of accurate WHOIS data, and compliance with court orders, the Court found that these obligations were routinely disregarded in practice.

A significant aspect of the Court’s reasoning lies in its assessment of the commercial conduct of DNRs. The Court observed that many registrars actively monetise potentially infringing domain names by suggesting alternative domain variations incorporating wellknown marks, charging premium prices for such names, and offering auction and resale services. This commercial involvement, in the Court’s view, undermined the claim that DNRs function merely as neutral or passive intermediaries.

Privacy Protection and Misuse

One of the most critical issues examined was the default implementation of privacy protection services by DNRs. The Court acknowledged the importance of data protection under the General Data Protection Regulation and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. However, it held that privacy protection cannot operate as a blanket shield for unlawful activity. The Court reasoned that when privacy protection is enabled by default, it creates anonymity that directly facilitates fraud and frustrates enforcement efforts.

The Court clarified that disclosure of registrant information to trademark owners and law enforcement agencies constitutes a legitimate interest under both European and Indian data protection frameworks. Accordingly, the prevention of trademark infringement and investigation of cyber fraud were held to outweigh privacy concerns in such cases. The Court therefore concluded that privacy protection should operate strictly as an opt-in service, subject to meaningful consent and regulatory safeguards.

Failure of Verification Mechanisms

The judgment records serious deficiencies in the verification practices of DNRs. WHOIS records revealed fictitious names, non-existent addresses, and the use of temporary or banned email services. In one instance, the address provided by a fraudulent registrant was that of the trademark owner itself. The Court contrasted this lax approach with the regulatory framework governing .in domain names administered by NIXI, which mandates eKYC verification, valid contact details, and stricter compliance norms. This comparison reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the existing practices of many DNRs were inadequate and unsustainable.

Non Compliance with Court Orders

The Court also addressed the persistent refusal of certain foreign based DNRs to comply with Indian court orders. Correspondence placed on record showed that some registrars insisted on directions from courts in their home jurisdictions, effectively disregarding binding orders passed by Indian courts. The Court held that such conduct directly undermines the rule of law and necessitates regulatory intervention. Consequently, it upheld the invocation of powers under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, enabling the blocking of services of noncompliant DNRs through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology and the Department of Telecommunications.

Intermediary Liability under the IT Act

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to analysing whether DNRs are entitled to safe harbour protection under Section 79 of the IT Act. While recognising DNRs as intermediaries, the Court emphasised that safe harbour is conditional upon the intermediary’s role being limited to passive facilitation. Relying on the principles laid down in Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 145, the Court reiterated that domain names perform a source identifying function akin to trademarks.

Further, drawing from Snapdeal Pvt. Ltd. v. GoDaddy.com LLC 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1092, the Court held that intermediaries who exercise control, promote infringing content, or derive commercial benefit from such activity cannot claim immunity. The ratio emerging from these decisions, as applied in the present case, is that active facilitation and monetisation of infringing domain names disentitle DNRs from safe harbour protection, rendering them liable to injunctive relief and, where appropriate, monetary consequences.

Dynamic and Dynamic Plus Injunctions

The judgment makes a significant contribution to trademark enforcement jurisprudence by elaborating upon the concept of Dynamic and Dynamic Plus Injunctions. A conventional injunction operates only against specific, identified infringing domain names. In contrast, a dynamic injunction allows the rights holder to seek extension of the injunction to newly discovered infringing domains without initiating fresh proceedings.

The Court went a step further by granting a Dynamic Plus injunction, which extends to mirror websites, redirecting domains, and alphanumeric or typographical variations of the infringing domain names. The rationale underlying this approach is the inherently evasive nature of online fraud, where infringers rapidly shift between domain names to circumvent judicial orders. At the same time, the Court imposed clear limitations, holding that such expansive relief is justified only in cases involving invented, arbitrary, or fanciful trademarks with established goodwill. For descriptive or generic marks, injunctions remain confined to specific domain names unless extended through judicial scrutiny.

Banking and Regulatory Reforms

Recognising that domain name fraud often succeeds due to weaknesses in financial systems, the Court issued directions to strengthen banking safeguards. It took note of the Reserve Bank of India’s implementation of the Beneficiary Bank Account Name Lookup facility for RTGS and NEFT transactions, enabling remitters to verify account holder details prior to transferring funds. Additionally, the Court endorsed standard operating procedures formulated by the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau to ensure timely cooperation by banks with law enforcement agencies.

Conclusion

The judgment represents a comprehensive judicial response to the evolving challenges of domain name fraud and online trademark infringement. By clarifying the limits of intermediary immunity, curbing the misuse of privacy protection, and introducing dynamic enforcement mechanisms, the Court has laid down a robust framework for future cases. Importantly, the decision recognises that effective trademark protection in the digital age requires coordinated accountability across registrars, platforms, financial institutions, and regulatory authorities. In doing so, the Court has reinforced public trust in digital commerce while ensuring that technological progress does not come at the cost of legal enforcement.

Co-authored by Shambhavi Sharma.