No Appeal Beyond Section 37: Bombay High Court Holds That the Commercial Courts Act Cannot Create an Alternative Appellate Route Against Orders Recording Satisfaction of an Arbitral Award

The Bombay High Court has clarified that an order passed in execution proceedings relating to an arbitral award cannot be challenged by way of a Commercial Appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, unless the order falls within the appealable categories prescribed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Introduction

The Bombay High Court, in its judgment dated 20 July 2026 in Reliance Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. Hiroo Hotchand Advani [Commercial Appeal (L) Nos. 14725 and 15441 of 2026], considered an important question concerning the maintainability of appeals against orders passed during execution of arbitral awards.

The central issue before the Court was whether a party aggrieved by an order of an executing court in proceedings concerning an arbitral award could invoke Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”) to maintain a Commercial Appeal, even where the impugned order did not fall within any of the categories expressly made appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).

The Division Bench of Justice Bharati Dangre and Justice Manjusha Deshpande answered the question in the negative. It held that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not confer an independent substantive right of appeal in arbitration matters. It principally provides the forum for an appeal where a right of appeal otherwise exists. In matters governed by the Arbitration Act, the substantive right of appeal must therefore be traced to Section 37. An order falling outside Section 37 cannot be made appealable merely by invoking Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act.

The judgment is significant because it addresses the interplay between two statutes containing overriding provisions. While Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act gives that legislation overriding effect over inconsistent laws, Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, following its amendment in 2019, begins with a non-obstante clause and expressly provides for appeals from specified orders “and from no others”. The Bombay High Court held that the latter provision operates to preserve the limited appellate regime contemplated by the Arbitration Act.

Factual Background

The dispute arose from two arbitral awards dated 22 October 2012, which were subsequently modified by orders dated 24 November 2018, in favour of the award holder, Reliance Asset Reconstruction Company Limited.

For enforcement of the awards, the award holder instituted Commercial Execution Applications before the Commercial Division of the Bombay High Court against Hiroo Hotchand Advani. During the execution proceedings, the award debtor contended that the liabilities under both awards had already been discharged through an out-of-court payment. The award holder disputed this contention, principally on the ground that the alleged payment had not been certified or recorded by the executing court in accordance with Order XXI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

The dispute resulted in Chamber Summons Nos. 550 of 2019 and 552 of 2019 being filed in the respective execution proceedings. By a common order dated 23 March 2026, the learned Single Judge, exercising jurisdiction as the executing court, rejected the Chamber Summons and held that the two arbitral awards stood fully satisfied on the basis of the out-of-court payment. Consequently, the execution proceedings were disposed of.

Aggrieved by this order, the award holder filed two Commercial Appeals under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, contending, inter alia, that neither party had made an application under Order XXI Rule 1 or Rule 2(1) or Rule 2(2) of the CPC, and that the alleged payment had never been certified or recorded by the executing court. According to the award holder, treating an uncertified out-of-court payment as complete satisfaction of the arbitral awards was contrary to Order XXI Rule 2(3) CPC.

Before the Division Bench could examine the merits of these contentions, however, the award debtor raised a preliminary objection concerning the maintainability of the Commercial Appeals themselves.

Statutory Framework: Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act

The maintainability question required the Court to examine the relationship between Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act provides for an appeal against a judgment or order of a Commercial Court or Commercial Division. Its proviso, however, restricts appeals to orders specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Section 13(2) further provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.

Section 37 of the Arbitration Act sets out the appellate mechanism under the Arbitration Act. Under Section 37(1), an appeal lies against:

1. an order refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8;
2. an order granting or refusing to grant a measure under Section 9; and
3. an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.

Section 37(2) separately provides for appeals against specified orders of an arbitral tribunal under Sections 16 and 17.

Importantly, Section 37(1), as amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, now begins with the words:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal…”

The amendment came into effect on 30 August 2019. The Bombay High Court considered this amendment central to resolving the apparent conflict between Section 37 of the Arbitration Act and Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act.

Bombay High Court’s Analysis

1. Section 13(1-A) does not independently create a right of appeal in arbitration matters

The Court first considered the scope of Section 13(1-A) and its proviso. The award holder relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s decision in MITC Rolling Mills Private Limited v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2375. In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, although not specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC, could nevertheless be appealed under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Supreme Court held that rejection of a plaint finally determines the rights of the parties and constitutes a “decree” within the meaning of the CPC. The appeal was therefore maintainable. The Bombay High Court had itself followed this reasoning in Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke v. Controller of Patent and Designs. However, the Court held that MITC Rolling Mills could not be mechanically extended to appeals arising from arbitration proceedings.

The Court distinguished the CPC framework from the Arbitration Act on the basis that the Arbitration Act is a special and self-contained statutory code, designed to minimise judicial intervention. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act itself embodies this legislative policy by restricting judicial intervention to circumstances specifically contemplated by the Act. Accordingly, the existence of a final adjudication or an order conclusively determining the rights of parties does not, by itself, create an appellate remedy under Section 37.

2. The 2019 amendment to Section 37 reinforces the exhaustive appellate scheme

The Court placed particular emphasis on the 2019 amendment to Section 37. The amendment was considered in the context of the recommendations of the High Level Committee chaired by Justice B.N. Srikrishna. The Committee had recommended amendments to Sections 37 and 50 of the Arbitration Act, including the insertion of the words “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law”.

According to the Bombay High Court, the amendment demonstrated a legislative intention to restrict the scope of appeals under the Arbitration Act and to prevent an alternative appellate route from being created through another statute, including the Commercial Courts Act. The Court observed that Parliament was presumed to be conscious of the Commercial Courts Act and its overriding provision under Section 21 when Section 37 was amended.

Consequently, the non-obstante clause in Section 37 was understood as giving the Arbitration Act’s appellate regime precedence in matters governed by that provision. The Court therefore held that the words “and from no others” in Section 37 must be given meaningful effect.

3. Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act primarily identifies the appellate forum; it cannot enlarge Section 37

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation, (2018) 14 SCC 715, which had considered the interplay between the Commercial Courts Act and the Arbitration Act in the context of appeals concerning enforcement of foreign awards. In Kandla Export Corporation, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act constitutes a self-contained code and that a general appellate provision under the Commercial Courts Act cannot be used to create an appeal where the Arbitration Act does not provide one.

The Bombay High Court applied this principle to the present case. The Court held that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not independently confer a substantive right of appeal in arbitration matters. Where an appeal is available under Section 37, Section 13 may operate to identify the appropriate appellate forum. But where Section 37 does not permit an appeal, Section 13 cannot be used to create one. This distinction between the substantive right of appeal and the forum of appeal was central to the Court’s reasoning.

4. An arbitral award is treated as a decree only for the purposes of execution

The award holder also sought to rely upon the fact that an arbitral award is enforceable as a decree under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The Court rejected the suggestion that this statutory fiction could transform an order passed in execution proceedings into an appealable decree for purposes of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Court specifically noted that an award under Section 36 is equated with a decree of the court for the purposes of execution, but does not receive the same status as a decree of a civil court for all purposes. Therefore, the fact that the CPC applies to the execution of an arbitral award does not, by itself, import every appellate consequence applicable to a civil court decree into the arbitration framework.

5. No artificial distinction between “Judgment” and “Order” can create an appeal

The award holder further argued that the impugned decision was a “Judgment or Order” within the meaning of Section 13(1-A) and had finally determined the rights of the parties. The Court rejected this argument.

It explained that the expression “Order” under the Arbitration Act is capable of covering both interlocutory directions and final adjudications. Section 37 itself demonstrates this because an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 may finally determine the dispute concerning the award and is nevertheless described as an “order”.

Accordingly, the fact that an order finally determines the lis cannot, by itself, make it appealable. The Court held that an artificial distinction between the words “Judgment” and “Order” under Section 13(1-A) cannot be employed to bypass the exhaustive appellate framework under Section 37.

Application to the Execution Order

Applying these principles, the Court examined the order which had treated the two arbitral awards as satisfied. The impugned order was passed in execution proceedings and did not concern:

• refusal to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8;
• grant or refusal of an interim measure under Section 9; or
• setting aside or refusal to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.

It therefore did not fall within any of the categories specified under Section 37(1). The Court consequently held that the order could not be challenged through a Commercial Appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Court also relied upon earlier Bombay High Court decisions, including Usha Kakade v. Khanderao R. Kakade and Shailendra Bhadauria, which emphasised that the question of substantive maintainability in arbitration matters must be determined by reference to the Arbitration Act and cannot be expanded through the Commercial Courts Act or CPC. The preliminary objection was therefore upheld and the two Commercial Appeals were dismissed as not maintainable. The pending Interim Applications were also disposed of.

Key Takeaways for Arbitration and Commercial Litigation

The judgment provides important guidance for parties involved in arbitral award enforcement and execution proceedings.

1. Section 13(1-A) is not an independent appellate gateway: A party cannot rely on the general language of Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act to establish a right of appeal in an arbitration matter where the Arbitration Act does not provide one.

2. Section 37 remains the critical provision for appellate maintainability: For orders arising from arbitration proceedings, the first question is whether the impugned order falls within the categories contemplated by Section 37. If it does not, a Commercial Appeal cannot ordinarily be maintained merely because the order was passed by a Commercial Court or Commercial Division.

3. The 2019 amendment to Section 37 has significant consequences: The non-obstante clause introduced into Section 37 with effect from 30 August 2019 reinforces the restrictive nature of the appellate mechanism under the Arbitration Act. The Bombay High Court treated this amendment as significant in determining the relationship between Section 37 and Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act.

4. Execution does not convert an arbitral award into a civil court decree for every purpose: Although Section 36 permits enforcement of an arbitral award as if it were a decree, this fiction is principally directed towards execution and enforcement. It cannot automatically be relied upon to import a separate appellate remedy that the Arbitration Act does not provide.

5. Parties must carefully identify the appropriate remedy: The decision highlights the importance of determining the statutory source of a right of appeal before invoking appellate jurisdiction. The absence of an appeal under Section 37 does not necessarily mean that a party is without any judicial remedy; depending on the nature of the order and the circumstances, other remedies, including appropriate supervisory jurisdiction, may have to be considered. The Bombay High Court itself noted the availability of revision or proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution, where appropriate.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Reliance Asset Reconstruction Company Limited v. Hiroo Hotchand Advani reinforces the principle that the appellate regime under the Arbitration Act cannot be expanded through the Commercial Courts Act.

The decision harmonises the apparently competing provisions of the two statutes by treating the Arbitration Act as the governing special legislation on appellate remedies in arbitration matters. While Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act may provide the forum where an appeal is otherwise available, it cannot create a substantive right of appeal against an order that falls outside Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

The ruling is particularly relevant to award holders, award debtors, lenders, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies and parties involved in arbitral award enforcement proceedings. It serves as a reminder that an order passed during execution of an arbitral award, even one that finally determines whether the award has been satisfied will not necessarily be appealable under the Commercial Courts Act.

The broader message is consistent with the legislative policy underlying Indian arbitration law: judicial intervention and appellate review are confined to the remedies expressly contemplated by the Arbitration Act, and a general procedural or commercial statute cannot be used to create an additional appellate layer.

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Last Updated on 3 September, 2026