Reaffirming the Retrospective Application of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Hansraj v. State of UP 

Introduction 

In a judgment delivered on October 9, 2025, in Hansraj v. State of Uttar Pradesh¹, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the enduring principle that the protective spirit of juvenile justice cannot be restricted by time. The case involved a petitioner convicted of murder committed in 1981 when he was only twelve years old. A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih held that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, applies retrospectively even to offences committed before its commencement. The Court found that since the petitioner was a juvenile at the time of the offence and had already served more than three years in custody, his continued detention violated Article 21 of the Constitution. 

Facts

The facts of the case trace back more than four decades. The petitioner, Hansraj, was born on 10 June 1969. When he was barely twelve years and five months old, an incident occurred on 2 November 1981 in which the father of the complainant was assaulted by a group of six individuals using knives and lathis. The victim succumbed to his injuries the following day. Hansraj was arrested a few days later but was soon released on bail after spending just over a month as an undertrial. 

The case was tried before the Special Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur, in Sessions Trial No. 8 of 1983. In August 1984, the Sessions Court found the accused guilty under Sections 302/149, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. Recognising Hansraj’s age, the court noted that he was about sixteen years old at the time and directed that he be sent to a children’s home under the Indian Children Act, 1960, instead of being imprisoned. This decision was meant to give him a chance to reform rather than face the rigours of adult incarceration. 

In 2000, Hansraj and his co-accused were discharged by the Allahabad High Court. The State of Uttar Pradesh sought to appeal, and ultimately in 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the discharge and restored the conviction. After the Supreme Court’s decision, Hansraj went into hiding, not to be seen again until he was rearrested in May 2022. By August 2025, he had spent nearly three years and ten months in custody. At this point, he filed a writ petition under Article 32 on the basis that his detention far exceeded the maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. 

Issue

The central issue for the Court was whether or not a person who was a juvenile at the time of the crime (which took place long before the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 came into force) could rely on the provisions of the Act, and obtain the benefit of being properly released. The court had to determine whether the Act had retrospective effect, and therefore Hansraj was entitled to his freedom because his time confined had already exceeded the maximum period of three years specified for juvenile detention. 

Arguments

On behalf of the petitioner, advocate Parinav Gupta argued that the petitioner was a juvenile at the time of the offence, a fact acknowledged even by the Sessions Court and later by the Supreme Court in 2009. Consequently, the petitioner was entitled to the complete protection of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000. As stated in Section 15(1)(g) of the Act, a juvenile cannot be held in detention for more than three years, and any detention beyond that time is an unlawful interference with their personal liberty. He related that such detention is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution which states the right to life and personal liberty. He relied on the cases of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand², Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh³, and Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar Pradesh⁴, all of which affirmed that provisions in juvenile justice legislation have retrospective application, and that juvenility can be raised at any time during the proceedings. 

Counsel for the State submitted that the crime in question took place in 1981, while the Indian Children Act, 1960, was in force, and as a result, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, could not apply in retrospect. The State further submitted that murder is a serious crime, which would attract life imprisonment, and therefore, should not attract leniency. The State maintained that Hansraj absconded for a considerable period of time following his restored conviction on the merits in 2009, that this conduct exemplifies an affront to the judicial process, and therefore should disentitle him to discretionary relief. The respondent relied on Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi)⁵, in which the Court characterized murder as a heinous crime, to further support its argument concerning the serious nature of murder. 

Judgment

After reviewing the applications and the record, the Supreme Court concluded that Hansraj was clearly a juvenile on the date of the offence. The Court noted that Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, which was introduced by the 2006 Amendment, expressly permits a claim of juvenility to be made at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case. The Court said this is the legislative intent to ensure no child is deprived of protection under juvenile law based purely on the passage of time or technicalities of procedure. 

Relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and the subsequent decisions in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan⁶, the Court reiterated that the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, applies retrospectively to all persons who were below eighteen years of age at the time of the offence, regardless of the timing of the trial or conviction. The Court determined that under the legislation prior to the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, it was not aware of a provision in the Indian Children Act, 1960, that would preclude it from providing relief under a newer and more protective statute. 

Justice Dipankar Datta, writing for the bench, observed that Hansraj’s incarceration for more than three years violated the procedure established by law and therefore constituted a clear breach of Article 21. The judgment stated that “since there is no quarrel with the fact that the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and having been behind bars for more than three years, his liberty has been curtailed not in accordance with law.” The Court directed the immediate release of the petitioner and instructed the authorities to act on the basis of the digital copy of the judgment to avoid any delay in restoring his liberty. 

Conclusion

The judgment affirms that juvenile protection is not constrained by the commission of an offence or by the procedural phase. The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is to be used prospectively, it is important that its protective purpose, to be applied retrospectively, will encompass every person who was a child when they transgressed the law, no matter how long ago that might have been.