Interplay Between Section 8 and Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Posted On - 20 March, 2026 • By - Atul N Menon

Can a Court Pass an Order Under Section 9 When a Section 8 Application Is Pending?

Abstract

This legal note examines a nuanced but practically significant question in Indian arbitration law: whether a Civil Court retains jurisdiction to grant interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, even when a Section 8 application seeking reference to arbitration is simultaneously pending before it. Drawing on the text of the Act, the 2015 amendment, and judicial precedent, this note concludes that while the pendency of a Section 8 application creates a jurisdictional tension, courts have consistently held that Section 9 relief may be granted in appropriate circumstances particularly where urgency demands immediate interim protection.

Introduction

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘the Act’) represents India’s legislative framework for domestic and international commercial arbitration. Two of its most litigated provisions namely Sections 8 and 9, frequently intersect in practice, giving rise to complex procedural questions that courts have grappled with over the years.

Section 8 empowers a judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration upon an application by a party to an arbitration agreement, effectively ousting the court’s jurisdiction over the merits of the substantive dispute. Section 9, on the other hand, preserves the court’s power to grant interim measures of protection both before and during arbitral proceedings and even after the making of an arbitral award but before its enforcement.

A recurring dilemma arises when, in the same suit or proceeding, one party files an application under Section 9 seeking interim relief (injunction, appointment of receiver, preservation of assets, etc.), while the opposing party simultaneously files a Section 8 application seeking to refer the dispute to arbitration. The central question this note addresses is:

“Can a court validly pass an order on a Section 9 application even when a Section 8 application has been filed by the opposite party and remains pending for adjudication?”

Statutory Framework

A. Section 8: Reference to Arbitration

Section 8 of the Act reads, in relevant part:

“(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”

The 2015 amendment significantly strengthened Section 8 by making the referral mandatory (replacing “shall refer” and tightening the preconditions), and by restricting judicial scrutiny only to whether a prima facie arbitration agreement exists. This amendment signalled a pro-arbitration legislative intent.

Key features of Section 8:

  • The application must be filed before the first statement on the substance of the dispute.
  • Once the preconditions are satisfied, reference is mandatory and the court has no discretion.
  • The only ground of refusal is the prima facie non-existence of a valid arbitration agreement.
  • A pending appeal against a Section 8 order does not stay the arbitration.

B. Section 9: Interim Measures by Court

Section 9 empowers a party to apply to a court for interim measures of protection. It provides:

“(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court for interim measures of protection in respect of any of the following matters…”

Section 9(3), inserted by the 2015 amendment, provides an important limitation:

“(3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.”

It is noteworthy that Section 9(3) restricts the court’s jurisdiction only after the arbitral tribunal is constituted not before, and not merely upon the filing of a Section 8 application.

The Jurisdictional Tension

When both applications i.e. Section 8 and Section 9 are pending simultaneously, a fundamental tension emerges. Section 8 seeks to divest the court of jurisdiction over the substantive dispute and refers it to arbitration. Section 9, by contrast, invokes the court’s continuing jurisdiction to protect the subject matter of the dispute pending arbitral proceedings.

The tension can be articulated as follows:

Section 8 PositionSection 9 Position
Once a valid arbitration agreement is established prima facie, the court must refer the parties to arbitration and effectively relinquishes jurisdiction over the dispute.The court retains a protective jurisdiction to grant interim relief to prevent irreparable harm, irrespective of where the substantive dispute is adjudicated.
Mandatory, non-discretionary in nature.Discretionary, equity-based relief.

The question is whether the filing of a Section 8 application, which has not yet been decided , suspends, eliminates, or otherwise limits the court’s power under Section 9.

Judicial Analysis: Can the Court Grant Section 9 Relief When Section 8 Is Pending?

The courts have consistently recognised that the filing of a Section 8 application does not, by itself, oust the court’s jurisdiction under Section 9. The ouster of jurisdiction occurs upon the actual referral of the dispute to arbitration by a court order under Section 8 not upon the mere filing of the Section 8 application.

This distinction is critical: until the court passes an order under Section 8 referring the dispute to arbitration, the court continues to possess jurisdiction over the proceedings, including jurisdiction to entertain a Section 9 application.

B. Key Judicial Precedents

Indian courts including the Supreme Court and various High Courts have addressed this issue in multiple decisions. The following judicial positions emerge:

1. Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 SCC 155

The Supreme Court held that a court has the power to entertain Section 9 applications even before the commencement of arbitral proceedings. The court’s protective jurisdiction under Section 9 is distinct from its adjudicatory jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute.

2. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. (2014)

The Bombay High Court affirmed that Section 9 jurisdiction is independent and protective in nature. The court may grant ad-interim relief under Section 9 even when a Section 8 application is pending, particularly where delay would render the relief illusory.

3. Chloro Controls India Pvt. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. (2013) 1 SCC 641

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the pro-arbitration approach and the limited judicial role under Section 8. However, the court implicitly acknowledged that interim protection remains available through Section 9 during the period between filing of the Section 8 application and its disposal.

4. Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Future Retail Limited (2021) 3 SCC 473

While this decision primarily addressed emergency arbitration, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the interplay between court jurisdiction and arbitral proceedings reinforced the principle that courts retain protective jurisdiction to prevent the frustration of future arbitral awards.

C. The Effect of the 2015 Amendment on This Question

The 2015 amendment inserted Section 9(3), which limits the court’s Section 9 jurisdiction once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, unless the tribunal’s remedies under Section 17 are shown to be inefficacious. Notably:

  • Section 9(3) operates as a limitation only after constitution of the tribunal.
  • There is no analogous restriction linked to the filing or pendency of a Section 8 application.
  • The legislature, therefore, made a deliberate choice: it restricted Section 9 only upon constitution of the tribunal, not upon the filing or pendency of a Section 8 application.

This legislative design strongly supports the conclusion that a court can pass a Section 9 order even when a Section 8 application is pending.

Practical Scenarios and Analysis

Scenario 1: Section 9 Application Filed First, Section 8 Filed Subsequently

Where a Section 9 application has already been filed and is pending, the subsequent filing of a Section 8 application by the opposite party does not render the Section 9 proceeding infructuous or abate it. The court may proceed to hear and decide the Section 9 application. The Section 8 application will be decided separately, and upon referral to arbitration, the arbitral proceedings will commence.

Scenario 2: Both Applications Filed Simultaneously or Near-Simultaneously

Courts have generally adopted the pragmatic position of deciding the Section 8 application first to determine whether jurisdiction exists. However, if the circumstances are urgent and there is a risk of irreparable harm, courts have granted ad-interim Section 9 relief even before hearing the Section 8 application. The Section 9 relief in such cases is typically limited and temporary preserving the status quo, pending decision on Section 8.

Scenario 3: Section 8 Application Decided and Reference Granted

Once a court grants a Section 8 application and refers the dispute to arbitration, the court’s jurisdiction over the substantive dispute ends. A Section 9 application filed thereafter (before the arbitral tribunal is constituted) is maintainable. However, once the tribunal is constituted, Section 9(3) requires the court to decline jurisdiction unless Section 17 remedies are inadequate.

Scenario 4: Section 8 Application Pending at Appellate Stage

If a Section 8 order is challenged in appeal, Section 8(3) of the Act (post-2015 amendment) specifically provides that the appeal shall not render the arbitration proceedings invalid. The court retains Section 9 jurisdiction during this period, subject to the general principles of interim relief.

Principles Governing Grant of Section 9 Relief

Regardless of the pendency of a Section 8 application, a party seeking Section 9 relief must satisfy the following conditions, which are consistent with the traditional requirements for interim injunctions under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:

  • Prima facie case: The applicant must demonstrate a strong prima facie case on the merits of the underlying claim.
  • Balance of convenience: The balance of convenience must favour the grant of relief i.e., the harm to the applicant if relief is refused must outweigh the harm to the respondent if relief is granted.
  • Irreparable harm: The applicant must show that the harm they will suffer without interim relief cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms.
  • Existence of arbitration agreement: There must be a valid arbitration agreement in place, this is the gateway requirement for Section 9 jurisdiction.

Courts have also considered factors such as conduct of the parties, urgency, risk of dissipation of assets, and whether the applicant has approached the court with reasonable expedition.

The Interplay: A Synthesis

The following propositions may be stated with confidence, drawing together the statutory text, legislative history, and judicial precedent:

1.A court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide a Section 9 application even when a Section 8 application is pending before it in the same proceeding.
2.The mere filing of a Section 8 application does not oust the court’s Section 9 jurisdiction. Ouster occurs only upon the actual order of referral under Section 8.
3.In urgent cases, a court may grant ad-interim relief under Section 9 even before disposing of the Section 8 application, in order to preserve the subject matter of the dispute.
4.Once the Section 8 application is decided and the dispute is referred to arbitration, Section 9 relief remains available subject to Section 9(3) once the arbitral tribunal is constituted.
5.The standard for granting Section 9 relief (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable harm) applies irrespective of the pendency of a Section 8 application.
6.Section 9(3) restricts the court’s Section 9 jurisdiction only after constitution of the arbitral tribunal not upon filing or pendency of a Section 8 application. This is a deliberate legislative choice.
7.Courts have a duty to ensure that the remedy of arbitration is not frustrated by dissipation of assets or other mischief during the interregnum. Section 9 serves as the critical safety valve.

Conclusion

The pendency of a Section 8 application does not deprive a court of its jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of a Section 9 application. The two provisions operate on distinct planes i.e. Section 8 concerns the allocation of adjudicatory jurisdiction over the substantive dispute, while Section 9 concerns the court’s protective and preservatory jurisdiction, which is ancillary to and in aid of the arbitral process.

The better practice adopted by courts is to decide the Section 8 application first, where possible, as this determines the forum for substantive adjudication. However, where urgency or risk of irreparable harm demands immediate action, a court should not hesitate to pass a Section 9 order, subject to satisfying the applicable tests for interim relief.

Parties and practitioners should note:

  • File Section 9 applications promptly and with full disclosure of the Section 8 application, if any.
  • Where a Section 8 application is pending, it is prudent to request the court to decide Section 8 first or to limit Section 9 relief to preservatory measures pending decision on Section 8.
  • In urgent cases, seek ad-interim relief under Section 9 with an express caveat that the Section 8 application is pending, to avoid procedural challenge.
  • Ensure that the arbitration agreement and its applicability to the dispute in question are clearly pleaded in both the Section 8 and Section 9 applications.

The Indian judiciary has, on the whole, adopted a purposive and pro-arbitration approach that preserves the efficacy of both sections, recognising that they serve complementary and not competing objectives within the architecture of the Act.