MP High Court Dismisses Plea Against Film “Haq”, Holds Privacy And Personality Rights Do Not Survive Death

Background of the Case

The Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, on 04th November 2025, in Ms Siddiqua Begum Khan v. Union of India & Ors. dismissed a writ petition seeking to restrain the release of the Hindi feature film “Haq”. The film was alleged to be based on the life of Shah Bano Begum and the landmark Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985).

The petitioner, claiming to be the daughter and sole surviving legal heir of Shah Bano Begum, contended that the film violated her late mother’s right to privacy, dignity, and reputation by dramatizing private and matrimonial aspects of her life without consent.

Petitioner’s Contentions

The Petitioner claimed that the personality and moral rights are inheritable and those of late Shah Bano Begum have been inherited by the petitioner. She argued that the teaser and trailer of the film suggested fabricated and sensationalised content beyond what was available in the public record, and that the only authentic account of her parents’ lives was the Supreme Court judgment itself. On this basis, she sought directions restraining the release, screening, promotion, and certification of the film.

Respondents’ Submissions

The producers and distributors of the film opposed the petition, submitting that “Haq” was not a biopic or documentary but a fictionalised and dramatised adaptation inspired by a book and public records, including the Shah Bano judgment. They emphasised that the film carried a detailed disclaimer clearly stating that the narrative was fictional and not intended to depict real persons or events. It was further contended that the right to privacy and personality rights are personal and extinguish upon death and therefore could not be enforced by legal heirs.

The respondents also pointed out that the film had been duly certified by the Central Board of Film Certification with a UA 13+ certificate, giving rise to a presumption of legality, and that the petitioner had an effective alternate remedy under the Cinematograph Act, which she had failed to exhaust. Additionally, they argued that the petition was barred by delay and laches, as the petitioner approached the Court barely days before the scheduled release despite the film having been publicly promoted for several months.

Findings of the High Court

On Posthumous Privacy and Personality Rights

After considering the submissions, the High Court held that the right to privacy, dignity, and personality is a personal right that does not survive the death of the individual. Relying on decisions such as Deepa Jayakumar v. A.L. Vijay and Krishna Kishore Singh v. Sarla A. Saraogi, the Court reiterated that privacy rights are non-heritable and cannot be claimed by legal representatives after death.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had not alleged any infringement of her own privacy or reputation but had sought to assert rights exclusively on behalf of her deceased mother, which was impermissible in law.

On Creative Expression and Disclaimers

The Court examined the disclaimer used in the film and found it to be clear and sufficient to inform viewers that the film was a fictionalised. It held that creative expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution permits fictional reinterpretation and dramatization of real events, provided the work does not purport to present itself as a historically accurate account.

The Court further observed that once a matter becomes part of the public domain through judicial proceedings, it can legitimately be the subject of commentary, analysis, and creative adaptation, as recognised in R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu. The Shah Bano litigation, having been extensively discussed in public discourse for decades, could not be shielded from creative engagement on the grounds of privacy.

On CBFC Certification

On the issue of certification, the Court held that the grant of a UA 13+ certificate by the CBFC carried a prima facie presumption of validity. In the absence of any allegation of procedural irregularity or mala fides in the certification process, the High Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction to interfere with the certification.

On Delay and Laches

The Court also found the petition to be vitiated by delay and laches, noting that the teaser, trailer, and promotional material had been in the public domain well before the petition was filed, and that last-minute challenges on the eve of release could not be encouraged.

Distinguishing Earlier Precedents

In distinguishing precedents relied upon by the petitioner, such as Phoolan Devi v. Shekhar Kapoor and Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, the Court clarified that those cases involved either living individuals or claims where reputational harm to surviving relatives was specifically pleaded, which was not the case here.

Conclusion and Significance of the Judgment

Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition in its entirety, holding that privacy and personality rights do not survive death, that fictionalised works inspired by public records are protected by constitutional free speech guarantees.

The judgment reinforces the legal position that creative freedom cannot be curtailed merely because a work draws inspiration from real events and provides important clarity on the limits of posthumous privacy and personality rights claims in Indian jurisprudence.