Supreme Court clears the air around Limitation Period in Adverse Possession cases

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neelam Gupta and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Gupta and Another[1] provided a crucial clarification with respect to the period of limitation for proving title by adverse possession. The Division Bench comprising Justice CT Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar ruled that the period starts from the moment the defendant’s possession becomes adverse, instead of from when the plaintiff acquires the right of ownership over the disputed property.

The defendant claimed to have gained adverse possession over the plaintiff’s property and their argument rested on the fact that they had been in possession of the property as a lessee since 1968, which is when the plaintiff acquired ownership. It was contended that the plaintiff’s suit for repossessing the property, filed in 1986, was time-barred, as it was not brought within the prescribed 12-year limitation period as per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

However, the Court rejected this argument and upheld the High Court’s earlier ruling, which relied on the precedent set in the case of Saroop Singh v. Banto and Ors[2] wherein it was held that once a plaintiff establishes their title to the property, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that they have acquired the title through adverse possession and thereby period of limitation does not begin when the plaintiff acquires ownership but only when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse.

The Court observed that the defendant had initially occupied the property as a lessee and classified it as “permissive possession.” In such cases, the tenant or lessee cannot claim adverse possession against the landlord or the property owner, as their possession was granted with permission and therefore does not qualify as adverse.

Reference was made to the case of Brij Narayan Shukla (D) through LRs. v. Sudesh Kumar alias Suresh Kumar (through LRs.) and Ors.[3], wherein the Supreme Court had held that tenants or lessees could not claim adverse possession against the landlord or lessor, as their possession was inherently permissive. The principle established in that case was applicable here, and the defendant’s claim of adverse possession was further weakened by their status as a former lessee.

In addition to the nature of possession, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of meeting certain conditions to qualify for adverse possession. Specifically, the defendant must demonstrate “animus possidendi”—the intention to possess the property in a manner that is hostile to the true owner’s rights. Moreover, the defendant’s possession must be open, continuous, and uninterrupted for the entire prescriptive period.

In this instance, the Court found that the defendant had failed to provide sufficient evidence of adverse possession. Instead of proving a hostile and adverse claim to the property, the defendant’s evidence suggested that their possession was still permissive in nature. Furthermore, the defendant could not establish when their possession had transitioned from permissive to adverse, a critical element in determining when the limitation period for adverse possession begins.

The Court concluded that the defendants did not meet the necessary criteria for adverse possession and held as follows:

“The evidence presented by the defendants reveals that instead of establishing a hostile claim to the property, they have only shown permissive possession. They have also failed to demonstrate when their possession became adverse and continuous for the prescriptive period,”

Conclusion:

This ruling reinforces the importance of clear and continuous evidence in cases of adverse possession and underscores that permissive possession, such as that held by tenants or lessees, cannot form the basis for such a claim. The Court’s decision also highlights that defendants seeking to establish adverse possession must provide precise evidence showing when their possession became adverse to the true owner, and that they maintained such possession for the required period under the Limitation Act.

[1] Civil Appeal Nos. 3159-3160 of 2019

[2] 2005 (8) SCC 330

[3] Civil Appeal No. 7502 of 2012