Expanding The Protective Ambit: Alimony And Interim Maintenance In Void Marriages

Introduction:

The Supreme Court’s ruling in the case Sukhdev Singh v Sukhbir Kaur[1] on February 12 addresses a long-debated issue, whether a spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act (‘HMA’) is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25, and whether interim maintenance may be granted under Section 24, even when the marriage is void or voidable. In this case, the Court comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, and Augustine George Masih provided clarity on the interpretation of the phrase “any decree” in Section 25, affirming that decrees of nullity (despite rendering a marriage void ab initio) fall within the ambit of the alimony provisions.

Issues Raised:

1. Whether a spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11—owing to reasons such as bigamy, prohibited relationships, or sapinda relationships, is eligible to claim permanent alimony or maintenance under Section 25 of the HMA. The legal contention here arises from the technical premise that a void marriage is deemed to have never legally existed. Consequently, the argument follows that a decree declaring a marriage void should not be considered “any decree” for the purpose of invoking the alimony provisions.
2. Whether, in the pendency of proceedings for a decree under the HMA (which includes cases where the marriage may be void or voidable), the matrimonial court is empowered to grant interim maintenance (maintenance pendente lite).

Appellant’s Arguments:

The appellant-husband argued that a void marriage is void ab initio, meaning that from the moment of its solemnization, it does not exist in the eyes of the law. He contended that since a void marriage is legally non-existent, any decree declaring such a marriage null should not be classified as a “decree” under Section 25. According to this view, the term “any decree” should be interpreted to exclude declarations of nullity because the legal status of a void marriage is fundamentally different from that of a valid marriage that is later dissolved by a divorce decree.

The appellant further maintained that since a marriage that is void from its inception does not create a marital relationship, a spouse cannot claim the benefits of permanent alimony or maintenance. He relied on previous judicial pronouncements and certain interpretations—such as those in cases like Bhausaheb @ Sandhu v. Leelabai[2], that appear to draw a distinction between a divorced wife and a wife from a void marriage, suggesting that equating the two would lead to untenable results. Additionally, the appellant argued that recognizing a decree of nullity for the purposes of Section 25 could incentivize morally questionable conduct, such as concealing a subsisting marriage or engaging in bigamous relationships, thereby rendering the provision open to misuse.

Respondent’s Arguments:

The respondent-wife, on the other hand, argued that a plain reading of Section 25 demonstrates that the legislature made no express distinction between a decree of divorce and a decree of nullity when enacting the provision. She asserted that the phrase “any decree” is intended to be all-encompassing, thereby including decrees that declare a marriage void under Section 11. The respondent contended that the legislative intent behind Section 25 was to provide comprehensive financial protection to both parties, regardless of whether the marriage was valid at the time of its dissolution or declared void ab initio. She further emphasized that the remedy of permanent alimony is discretionary and must be tailored to the facts and conduct of the parties.

Similarly, with respect to Section 24, the respondent argued that the statutory provision for interim maintenance should not be precluded merely because the marriage is void or voidable. Instead, as long as there is an active proceeding under the HMA and the party seeking relief can demonstrate that they lack an independent income sufficient for support, the court should have the authority to grant interim maintenance.

Judgment:

Section 24 of HMA deals with maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. It is meant to prevent a party without much independent income from surfacing enough to pay for itself and for the case while the case is pending. If the court concludes that either spouse does not have the necessary financial means, it is, on the request of the aggrieved spouse, able to require payment of expenses during the divorce proceedings by the other spouse. Moreover, the court can also order the respondent to pay the petitioner a sum of money every month until the whole issue has been resolved, which will be determined based on the incomes of both parties so that the parties remain on an even playing field. This system balances the needs of temporary cash flow while safeguards the interest of the financially weaker party in the context of dispute

Section 25 of HMA grants courts the authority to order maintenance payments in divorce or separation cases. Either spouse can apply for financial support, and the court may direct the respondent to pay a lump sum, or periodic payments based on factors such as the incomes, properties, conduct, and circumstances of both parties. The court can secure these payments by charging the respondent’s immovable property if necessary.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s claim that a decree of nullity falls under consideration akin to ‘any decree’ as defined in Section 25 of the HMA. The Court stated that the words of the statute are clear enough on their own, reflecting the intention to include nullity decrees. The Court noted that the legislative intent was not to create a differentiation between the two cases for purposes of the divorce but rather to ensure that the spouse who stands to suffer is provided with the necessary economic support. In addition, the Court restated its position that both permanent alimony under Section 25 and interim maintenance order under Section 24 are discretionary powers.

“Any decree” is another leading phrase whose interpretation is so central to the judgment. The Court was right in construing the section to include decrees of nullity. This construction will ensure that the statutory framework for permanent alimony will not be rendered nugatory by the technical existence of the marriage. This is in line with the overarching HMA policy of safeguarding economically vulnerable spouses after a marriage is ended. The court further clarifies that financial assistance should not depend on the strict question of existence of marriage on if it would cause hardship to the other party, usually the wife, who ends up suffering the most.

Conclusion:

The analysis tells us that both Section 24 and Section 25 are crafted in a manner that serves the purpose of aiding all economically needy people without respect to their actual marital status, as such people face challenges economically. Both permanent alimony and interim maintenance are still matters of personal discretion, subject to detailed inquiry into the behaviour and finances of the respective parties. In sum, the decision is a strong suggestion that matrimonial law and its practice need to be approached with sensitivity and not with mechanical rigidity.

[1] Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019

[2] AIR 2004 Bom 283.

King Stubb & Kasiva,
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